Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1981

Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage
Vincent A. Blasi
Columbia Law School, blasi@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Vincent A. Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2939

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The
Central Linkage
Vincent Blasi*
L

THE INQUIRY

The doctrine of prior restraint embodies a temporal preference. Acts of expression that could be sanctioned by means of
criminal punishment or a civil damage award may not be regulated "in advance." The factor of timing, however, cannot serve
to distinguish methods of regulation as neatly as this statement
would seem to imply. In addition to a retrospective impact relating to punishment or compensation, criminal prohibitions
and civil liability rules are meant to have a prospective impact-to deter speakers from engaging in harmful acts of expression in the future. If impact on speech before the moment
of its dissemination is not by itself a basis for distinguishing
methods of speech regulation, what then is it that makes a law
a prior restraint? And why are prior restraints disfavored at

all?
Even after fifty years, Near v. Minnesota' remains the
Supreme Court's most important opinion on this subject. Near
invalidated as a prior restraint one unusual type of injunction
designed to abate a newspaper as a public nuisance. Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion analogized the Minnesota procedure at issue to the classic system of administrative licensing
that, in Harry Kalven's words, "has come down to us through
English history with a bad name."2 The decision would be a
* © Vincent Blasi, 1981. Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School. I would like to thank the following persons for reading and comment-

ing upon a preliminary draft of this paper Lee Bollinger, Jesse Choper, Edward Cooper, Lyle Denniston, John Ely, Thomas Emerson, Owen Fiss, Marc
Franklin, Mary Hendriksen, Yale Kamisar, Richard Lempert, Anthony Lewis,
Paul Mishkin, Henry Monaghan, Richard Ovelmen, Thomas Scanlon, Martin

Shapiro, Philip Soper, Geoffrey Stone, Peter Westen, and Christina Whitman. I
would also like to acknowledge the resourceful research assistance of Stuart
Gasner, Tracey Goldblum, and Carolyn Rosenberg.

1. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2. Kalven, Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War-, 85 HARv. L REv.
3, 31 (1971).
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landmark had it accomplished nothing more than to import into
modern first amendment doctrine the eighteenth century aversion to licensing.3 But Near has had a broader impact. Chief
Justice Hughes's forceful essay on the evils of prior restraint,
combined with the Court's action invalidating an injunction,
has had the effect of turning prior restraint into a functional
rather than merely a technical or historical concept. The Court
no longer asks whether a challenged procedure amounts to the
equivalent of a licensing system, as the Minnesota nuisanceabatement scheme arguably did.4 "Prior restraint" has taken
on a broader, some would say incoherent, meaning.
The key to this expansion of meaning is the proposition
that all, or at least most, injunctions are prior restraints. Near
did not hold that flat out. The peculiar features of the Minnesota procedure were emphasized in the majority opinion. 5 Yet
both the dissent in Near and the early commentators assumed
that other less distinctive injunctions would thereafter be regarded as prior restraints subject to an unusually heavy burden
of justification. 6 Moreover, several Supreme Court decisions
since that time, typically citing Near, have treated various
kinds of injunctions as prior restraints.7 These cases may establish the principle that all injunctions are prior restraints.
On the other hand, each Supreme Court decision that holds an
injunction to be an unconstitutional prior restraint can also be
explained on substantive grounds such as the vagueness or
overbreadth of the prohibition, 8 the illegitimacy of the injunc3. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152. The history of the
struggle against licensing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is reviewed briefly in Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 648, 650-52 (1955), and at length in F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
ENGLAND 1476-1776 (1952).
4. See State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 462, 219 N.W. 770, 772
(1928), rev'd sub nom. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
5. 283 U.S. 697, 709-13 (1931).
6. Id. at 735-38 (Butler, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNrrED STAIES 378-81 (1941); Note, 31 COLUM. I. REV. 1148 (1931).
7. See, e.g., Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977)
(pretrial non-publication order); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976) (pretrial non-publication order); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971).
8. The injunction in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971), prohibited the persons enjoined from passing out any literature whatsoever anywhere within the boundaries of a suburban community. Id. at 417-20.
The restraint in Near itself, prohibiting the publishing of any "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper," would surely be invalidated under the
modern vagueness doctrine, even if embodied in a criminal statute.
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tion under the doctrine of separation of powers, 9 or the constitutional immunity of the speech activity in question from any
sort of restraint, subsequent as well as prior.O Furthermore,
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission," one of
the Court's most recent pronouncements on the subject, appears to reject the notion that injunctions as a class should be
grouped together with licensing systems for special disfavored
treatment under the first amendment. "The special vice of a
prior restraint," said Justice Powell for the majority, "is that
communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate deter2
nuination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment."'
That vice is exhibited, Powell noted, only by certain types of injunctions such as overly broad prohibitions, restraints based
on a high degree of speculation regarding the likely consequences of the expression in question, and temporary restraining orders.
Academicians as well are coming to feel increasingly uneasy about the proposition that the standard injunction against
speech should be burdened with the same adverse presumption that stalks the classic system of administrative licensing.
Owen Fiss has been the most forceful on this point,13 but Stephen Barnett sounds a similar theme in his brief but insightful
article on prior restraint.14 Other commentators have criticized
the undiscriminating nature of the presumption against prior
restraint, and have urged instead a highly particularistic ap9. The pivotal opinions by Justices Stewart and White in New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), refusing to permit the government to
enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers on the basis of inherent executive
authority, are based on this ground. Id. at 727-40.
10. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568-70 (1976), appeared to
rely heavily on the doctrine of prior restraint in striking down a judge's pretrial
order against publication by the press of evidence "strongly implicative" of the
defendant's guilt. Other decisions, however, have fashioned the principle that
even subsequent punishments may not be imposed for the publication of information of a comparably sensitive nature. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (criminal punishment for publishing the name of a juvenile offender); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S 829 (1978)
(criminal punishment for publishing truthful information regarding the confidential proceedings of a judicial conduct commission); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (civil damage award for broadcasting the name of a
rape victim obtained from public records). These cases suggest that the prohibition against publication at issue in Nebraska Press would have been invalidated even had it been imposed by criminal statute rather than judicial order.
11. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
12. Id. at 390.
13. See 0. Fiss, THE CIvIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 69-74 (1978).
14. See Barnett, The Puzzle of PriorRestraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977).
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proach to the evaluation of regulatory procedures under the
first amendment.15
In this essay I revisit the issue introduced by Near: should
the injunction, as a general matter, be regarded as a particularly repressive method of regulating speech, akin to the historically disfavored administrative licensing system? The
question is of importance in first amendment theory because
the modem doctrine of prior restraint would be thrown into
disarray should one of its two central props be removed. That
denouement may be all to the good. Perhaps there has been
too much reliance in recent times on the rhetoric of prior restraint as a substitute for more discriminating analysis.16
Before the analogy between injunctions and licensing systems
is rejected, however, a careful examination of its possible validity seems appropriate, particularly on so fitting an occasion as
this fiftieth anniversary celebration of Near v. Minnesota.
I build my inquiry around a search for features that modem licensing systems and injunctions have in common that
might warrant grouping them together for similar treatment in
first amendment analysis. Necessarily, I assess whether the
common features that might differentiate licensing systems and
injunctions from the standard "subsequent" punishmentscriminal prohibitions and civil liability rules-are significant
enough to warrant a special first amendment preference for the
latter forms of speech regulation. One could, of course, imagine
an argument against anti-speech injunctions that proceeds independently of the argument against licensing systems; the
"common features" approach is not a logical imperative. Nevertheless, the historic rejection of licensing and the prestige of
the Near decision are important symbols in contemporary
thinking about the first amendment. Modem prior restraint
doctrine would rest on a more secure footing if it could be
shown that injunctions can be identified with licensing systems
as a matter of close analysis as well as rhetorical flourish.
The identification of salient common features shared by licensing systems and injunctions would also be a logical starting point for constructing a general theory of prior restraint
that would help in deciding what additional methods of speech
regulation should be disfavored.17 In the present endeavor,
15. See, e.g., Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAD. L.
REv. 533, 537-45 (1951); Schauer, Fear,Risk, and the First Amendment- Unrav-

eling the "ChillingEffect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685, 725-30 (1978).
16. See Freund, supra note 15, at 539.
17. The label "prior restraint" could plausibly be applied to a wide variety
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however, I confine myself to the problem of injunctions. I thus
address only the core of the prior restraint doctrine, not the periphery. I do not even consider what should be done with specialized types of injunctions, such as interlocutory orders and
injunctions to enforce contracts or fiduciary duties, that deviate
from the prototype in significant ways. Nor do I explore
whether the current presumption against prior restraint is too
heavy or too light, or whether the standard for identifying permissible prior restraints should take the form of a categorical
rule, a principle admitting of unspecified exceptions, or a balancing test. These can be important questions, but only if the
central linkage at the root of modern prior restraint theory, the
grouping together of licensing systems and injunctions, makes

sense.
I begin with the Near opinion itself, to determine what
prompted the Court to perceive an analogy between the peculiar Minnesota nuisance-abatement procedure and administrative licensing. Then I examine the "prototypical" injunction
against speech, to see whether and how the analogy to licensing holds.

11. NEAR v. MINNESOTA
The statute at issue in Near provided that anyone who published a "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" newspaper
was guilty of a public nuisance subject to abatement. 8 The defense of truth was permitted only if the material was published
"with good motives and for justifiable ends."19 After publishing
nine issues of the Saturday Press, a vituperative scandal sheet
of regulatory procedures, especially if one adopts a functional definition emphasizing such features as informality of procedures, severity of impact on unformed speech, and discretion exercised by nonjudicial decisionmakers.
Consider, for example: registration requirements; withdrawals of postal privileges; film classification systems; police surveillance practices; taxes and other
cost impositions on publishing enterprises; inchoate crimes; systematic threats
to enforce the criminal law; probation conditions; allocation judgments regarding public resources such as parade routes, meeting halls, or even lecture fees;
administrative cease-and-desist orders; loyalty oaths and job disqualifications
based on past or present beliefs; insurance requirements for demonstrators; restrictions on the use of certain equipment by media organizations; book
seizures; arrest and bail procedures relating to prosecutions for advocacy; denial of press access to newsworthy events and records. The list could be extended almost infinitely. One reason we need a more satisfying theory of prior
restraint is to do a better job of demarcating the ambit of the concept.
18. Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, § 1, 1925 Mlinn. Laws 358.
19. Id.
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if ever there was one, 20 the defendants were perpetually enjoined from publishing "any publication whatsoever which is a
malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by
law."2 1 Violation of the injunction was punishable by criminal
contempt without benefit of trial by jury.
This Minnesota law did not establish a licensing system.
Publishers, even those who had been enjoined, did not have to
seek prior approval from anyone before publishing. Moreover,
the judgment that a particular writing was prohibited by law
was, under the Minnesota procedure, exclusively in the hands
of a court of general jurisdiction. No defacing imprimatur, no
bored and timid administrative censor, lurked in this scheme.
Yet the Supreme Court pronounced the injunction in Near a
prior restraint, and seized the occasion to establish the rejection of prior restraint as the central tenet of first amendment
doctrine. One who would make sense of the modern doctrine
of prior restraint must begin by determining exactly what the
majority in Near found so objectionable about the Minnesota
law.
Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion is not an essay
against regulating speech by injunction. The doctrine, well established at the time, that equity will not enjoin a libel is nowhere invoked.2 2 The Court appears to have been moved by
the "unusual, if not unique" features of a law that would treat
offending newspapers as nuisances to be abated. 23 Four features in particular are mentioned in the Near opinion:
First. The statute is not aimed at the redress of individual or private wrongs. Remedies for libel remain available and unaffected....
'This law is not for the protection of the person attacked nor to punish
the wrongdoer. It is for the protection of the public welfare."
Second. The statute is directed not simply at the circulation of
scandalous and defamatory statements with regard to private citizens,
but at the continued publication by newspapers and periodicals of
charges against public officers of corruption, malfeasance in office, or
serious neglect of duty...
Third. The object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary
sense, but suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical....
Fourth. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending
20. The fascinating journalistic background of the Near decision is recounted in F. FRmENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG (1981).
21. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 706 (1931) (quoting district court

order).
22. Equity doctrine relating to libel is summarized and criticized in Pound,
Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARv. L.
REV. 640 (1916).
23. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
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newspaper or periodical but to put the publisher under an effective
censorship.... Thus, where a newspaper or periodical has been suppressed because of the circulation of charges against public officers of
official misconduct, it would seem to be clear that the renewal of the
publication of such charges would constitute a contempt and that the
judgment would lay a permanent restraint upon the publisher, to escape which he must satisfy the court as to the character of a new
24
publication.

What is striking about these passages, certainly to one who
cut his first amendment teeth on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,25 is the Court's characterization of the Minnesota law as a
device to suppress criticism of government officials. Viewed in
this light, the injunction at issue in Near is more analogous to a
prosecution for seditious libel (under Sullivan, the paradigm
violation of the first amendment) than was the damage award
in Sullivan itself, which only purported to compensate an injured victim and punish the tortfeasor, not to suppress scandal
as inimical to the public welfare. There is reason to believe,
moreover, that the threat posed by the Minnesota law to robust
criticism of government figured significantly in the Court's reasoning. Repeatedly, Chief Justice Hughes's opinion sounds the
rejection-of-seditious-libel theme. He notes that in the eighteenth century, liberty of the press "was especially cherished
for the immunity it afforded from previous restraint of the publication of censure of public officers and charges of official misconduct.'"26 Surveying the American history of speech
regulation, he finds "almost an entire absence of attempts to
impose previous restraints upon publications relating to the
malfeasance of public officers."27 Turning to contemporary developments, Hughes observes that
the administration of government has become more complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime has
grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by
unfaithful officials and the impairment of the fundamental security of
life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes
the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great

cities.2 8

Even his response to the familiar liberty-but-not-license argument is limited to the seditious libel context: "The fact that the
liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of
scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of
24. Id. at 709-12.
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On
"The CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191.
26. 283 U.S. at 717 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 719-20 (emphasis added).
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the press from previous restraint in dealing with official
29
misconduct."
The Court's studied phrasing in the Near opinion is not the
only evidence that at that time the concept of prior restraint
was associated as much with the rejection of seditious libel as
with the rejection of the injunction as a procedure for regulating speech. The Near opinion itself purports to base its holding
on "the historic conception of the liberty of the press," 30 a
touchstone that calls for "regard to substance and not to mere
matters of form."3 1 Five years later, the Court invoked the
Near precedent in striking down a Louisiana tax on newspapers that discriminated against those publications with the
largest circulation.32 Because the larger newspapers had been
the chief critics of Governor Huey Long, the Court saw in the
tax an attempt to suppress criticism of government. Not only
did the Justices invalidate the tax; tellingly, they labeled it a
prior restraint.33 In contrast, during the 1940s the Court on several occasions failed to invoke the concept of prior restraint
while striking down state court injunctions prohibiting labor
34
picketing.
This substance-over-procedure thesis can be pushed too
far. The Court in Near clearly was disturbed by the dynamics
of the Minnesota scheme. Chief Justice Hughes noted, for example, that under the statute a publisher "undertaking to conduct a campaign to expose and to censure official derelictions"
may have his newspaper declared a public nuisance to be
abated "unless he is prepared with legal evidence to prove the
truth of the charges and also to satisfy the court that, in addition to being true, the matter was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends." 35 Once enjoined, Hughes observed, a
publisher may have an even more difficult burden of proof, for
the Minnesota Supreme Court had implied that "at least with.
respect to a new publication directed against official misconduct, the defendant would be held, under penalty of punishment for contempt as provided in the statute, to a manner of
publication which the court considered to be 'usual and legiti29. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 708.

31. Id.
32. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
33. Id. at 249.
34. See, e.g., Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943);
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
35. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 711-12 (1931).

1981]

THEORY OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

mate' and consistent with the public welfare." 36 This demand
that a publisher "satisfy the court as to the character of a new
publication" is given in the Near opinion as a major reason why
the Minnesota nuisance abatement procedure constitutes "the
37
essence of censorship."
In sum, Near v. Minnesota represents a judgment more
complex, and more historically grounded, than the facile equation of injunctions with licensing systems. The Court's conclusion that the injunction at issue amounted to a prior restraint
depended, at least to some extent, on: the content of the
speech (criticism of government) at which the injunction was
directed; the avowed purpose of the Minnesota nuisance law to
suppress not simply specified writings but also new efforts in
the same vein by the persons enjoined; the intrinsic vagueness
of the standards of legality embodied in the law; the placement
of certain key burdens of proof on the publisher rather than the
government; and the state's purpose to regulate disfavored
writings as a matter of public policy rather than to redress or
prevent private wrongs. 38 To conclude that such a regulatory
scheme, "tested by its operation and effect,"3 9 amounts to a
prior restraint is by no means to establish the proposition that
all injunctions against speech deserve the same fateful
characterization.
III. COMMON FEATURES OF LICENSING SYSTEMS
AND INJUNCTIONS: BEGINNING THE SEARCH
FOR A RATIONALE
A. THE PROTOTYPES
There are many kinds of licensing systems and several
types of injunctions. Variations in detail within these broad
forms of regulation can be significant. First amendment analysis would be complicated to the point of paralysis, however, if
each peculiar variant had to be assessed in relation to every
other variant before a "general" presumption could be applied
to certain of the variants. Instead, as is often true in legal analysis, some generalizing based on prototypes is both unavoidable and efficacious. Only if the common prototypes of the
speech-restrictive injunction and licensing system cannot be
36.

Id. at 712-13.

37. Id. at 713.
38.
39.

Id. at 715-21.
Id. at 708.
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shown to share significant and unique common features can it
be said that the concept of prior restraint lacks coherence.
My prototype for a licensing system is a procedure that requires a would-be speaker to obtain a permit from an administrative official before proceeding to speak; makes no provision
for a formal hearing before that official; subjects permit denials
to expeditious review by a court; and provides that persons
who speak without a required permit can be criminally punished for that act alone, without regard to whether they would
have been constitutionally entitled, had they pursued that
course, to obtain a license for the speech that is the subject of
the prosecution. The prototypical injunction I consider is what
Owen Fiss calls the non-interlocutory preventive injunction: a
judicial order, instituted after an adversary proceeding, that
prohibits identified persons from engaging in specified communicative activities, on pain of being held in criminal or civil contempt by the judge who issued the injunction. 40
Even in a consideration of prototypes, however, one important variation among injunctions must be taken into account.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. City of
Birmingham,4 1 a speaker sometimes may not violate an injunction as a means of testing its constitutionality. Instead, the enjoined speaker is obligated to mount a constitutional challenge
by moving to have the injunction vacated or modified, even if
the claim is that the injunction is unconstitutional on its face.
Under what is known as the collateral bar rule, failure to seek
such anticipatory relief precludes the speaker from invoking a
first amendment defense in a criminal contempt of court proceeding for violating the injunction.4 2 This withdrawal of selfhelp as a permissible remedy differentiates injunctions from
criminal prohibitions and civil liability rules, the violation of
which may actually be the preferred way to join the issue of
their constitutionality.
As some leading commentators have observed, it is the collateral bar rule rather than any of the other features of the in40. Fiss surveys the various types of injunctions in 0. Fiss, supra note 13,
at 8-12.
41. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
42. See generally Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHL L.
REV. 86 (1948); Rodgers, The Elusive Searchfor the Void Injunction: Res Judicata Principlesin Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 49 B.U. L. R.v. 251 (1969);
Selig, Regulation of Street Demonstrationsby Injunction: ConstitutionalLimitations on the CollateralBar Rule in Prosecutionsfor Contempt, 4 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 135 (1968); Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARv. L. REV.
626 (1970).
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junctive procedure that may warrant a special first amendment
presumption against injunctions that restrict speech.4 3 Take
away the collateral bar rule, these commentators say, and the

case for regarding injunctions as especially inimical to first
amendment values dissipates. Since licensing systems also restrict the use of self-help by would-be speakers, any analogy
between the two forms of regulation that are commonly labeled
prior restraint may hold only to the extent that injunctions are
governed by the collateral bar rule. Some lower courts have
gone so far as to hold that certain judicial orders prohibiting
publication are not prior restraints precisely because they are

not subject to the collateral bar rule.4 4

These observations would pose no particular problem for
the present analysis were it not for the fact that the scope of
the collateral bar rule for injunctions is highly uncertain. Restricted to its facts, Walker held only that self-help in the form
of a street demonstration involving hundreds of protestors in a
context of racial tension and violence is not a constitutionally
protected method of testing the validity of an injunction, at
least when other available avenues of legal relief have not been
explored by the speakers. 45 In subsequent cases, the Court has
permitted persons to violate other kinds of judicial orders and
still raise certain constitutional defenses in contempt proceedings.4 6 Lower courts have often limited the applicability of
43. See 0. Fss, supra note 13, at 30, 73; Barnett, supra note 14, at 553.
44. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.
1975); Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. La. 1977). See
also In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (thorough discussion in dictum
of relationship between prior restraint and collateral bar doctrines); Zarate v.
Younglove, 86 F!.RD. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (applicability of collateral bar rule an
important but not sole factor in determining whether an order is a prior
restraint).
45. 388 U.S. at 320. The Walker opinion does not allude to the unusual potential for disruption that self-help in the context of street demonstrations
might pose. Rather, the majority discusses the collateral bar rule as though it
were applicable in all contexts. With regard to the failure to explore alternative
remedies, however, the opinion is explicit:
This case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture if the
petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it in the
Alabama courts, and had been met with. delay or frustration of their
constitutional claims. But there is no showing that such would have
been the fate of a timely motion to modify or dissolve the injunction.
There was an interim of two days between the issuance of the injunction and the Good Friday march. The petitioners give absolutely no explanation of why they did not make some application to the state court
during that period.
Id. at 318-19.
46. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) (violation of court order
to produce evidence; privilege against self-incrimination allowed to be invoked
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Walker.47 Some state courts have declined to adopt the collat-

48
eral bar rule as a matter of state equity law.

Thus, any effort to compare injunctions with licensing systems, criminal prohibitions, and civil liability rules must take
into account the controversial nature and uncertain scope of
the collateral bar rule. Two prototypes of the injunction against
speech must be considered: one with and one without the collateral bar rule. First, I shall pursue my analogical inquiry assuming that self-help challenges to injunctions are not
permitted-assuming, that is, that the collateral bar rule of
Walker applies. As will be seen, that assumption makes easier
the case for linking together licensing systems and injunctions
as methods of regulation that are especially problematic under
the first amendment. Then I shall explore what remains of the
rationale for linkage if the assumption is reversed and the collateral bar rule is held not to govern. Only if the rationale remains convincing under that assumption would we have a
theory of prior restraint that transcends the controversy over
the validity and scope of the collateral bar rule.
B. POINTS OF COMPARISON
Initially, it is worth noting what licensing systems and injunctions do not have in common. A licensing system is objectionable in part because it subjects a wide range of expression
to scrutiny: a film licensing board typically requires the submission of all films that are to be exhibited in the jurisdiction; a
parade permit ordinance requires all would-be marchers to apply.49 That is not true of all, or even most, injunctions. Normally, even the broadest of injunctions binds only certain
designated speakers whose past or proposed speech activities
have engendered unusual official concern.
at contempt hearing); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (violation of
court order to testify after motion to quash subpoena denied; defendant allowed to raise first amendment defense in contempt proceedings). See also
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971) (Court reaffirmed the traditional
doctrine that the denial of a motion to quash a subpoena is not appealable because the proper forum for contesting the validity of a subpoena is the contempt proceeding).
47. See, e.g., In re Timmons, 607 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Halkin, 598
F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978); Glen v.
Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc.,
50 Ill. App. 3d 250, 365 N.E.2d 746 (1977).
48. See, e.g., State v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971); In re
Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
49. The range of activities governed by the regulatory scheme is a factor
emphasized in Emerson, supra note 3, at 655-56.
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Licensing systems are also troublesome because the initial
decision to disallow speech is made by an administrative officer
who specializes in suppression, and who will be held accountable for the harmful consequences of any communicative activity that is given approval.50 Moreover, under the typical
licensing procedure there is no adversary hearing before the
administrative officer who decides in the first instance whether
to allow or suppress the speech. 51 In contrast, injunctions are
issued by courts of general jurisdiction after full adversary
hearings.
Injunctions are sometimes considered dangerous to liberty
because violations of their terms can be punished expeditiously
in contempt proceedings.5 2 This might have been a major consideration in the days when persons charged with contempt of
court enjoyed none of the basic rights, such as trial by jury,
that are available to defendants in criminal prosecutions. Today, however, the rights of the accused in the two proceedings
are substantially similar.5 3 Any differences that remain-and
the major difference would seem to be that contempt charges
are adjudicated with much less pretrial delay--cannot be a basis for linking injunctions with licensing systems because the
standard enforcement mechanism for a licensing system is a
criminal prosecution for speaking without the required permit.
In the same vein, injunctions might be thought to be governed by an undesirable logic of rigid enforcement because the
decision to prosecute persons who disobey them typically is
made by the issuing judges, who may be overly sensitive to
perceived affronts to their authority, rather than by district attorneys, who must always decide whether the violation of a law
is serious enough to justify the commitment of limited
prosecutorial resources.M Again, this feature, while arguably
significant, is not one shared by licensing systems. Persons
who violate permit requirements are sanctioned only if a dis50. This concern was voiced centuries ago by John Milton. See J. MILTON,
THE PORTABLE MILTON 176-77 (D. Bush ed. 1949). For a modern formulation of
the point, see Emerson, supra note 3, at 658-59.
51. For an argument that prior restraint should be defined in terms of the

adequacy of the adjudicative process that precedes the judgment of disallowance, see Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HARv. C.R-CJ.L L REv.
519 (1977).
52. See, e.g., A. BIcKEL, THE MORAL= OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
53. See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 96-98 (1973). The
procedures for contempt proceedings and criminal trial are compared in the
text accompanying notes 90-93 infra.
54. See Emerson, supra note 3, at 657.
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trict attorney determines that prosecution is warranted in light
of the seriousness of the offense and competing pressures on
the criminal docket.
What then is it that licensing systems and injunctions have
in common that unites them in the mind of the first amendment theorist? I can think of five potentially important features
that appear on the surface to be shared by licensing systems
and injunctions, and appear not to be shared, at least to the
same extent, by criminal laws and civil liability rules: (1) the
tendency, when the practical dynamics of the scheme are considered, to induce persons to engage in an unusually high degree of self-censorship of constitutionally protected expression;
(2) the adjudication of constitutional claims at a time and in a
manner that produces a formal, abstract quality of decision
making; (3) the tendency to be used too readily; (4) an unusual
capacity to distort the way audiences respond to communications; and (5) implicit premises that are antithetical to the philosophy of limited government. If any one or combination of
these features turns out on close analysis to be notably more
characteristic of both licensing systems and injunctions than of
the standard "subsequent" sanctions on speech, and also significant in terms of first amendment values, we would have the
beginnings of a theory of prior restraint.
IV. SELF-CENSORSHIP
"Self-censorship" is an important phenomenon in first
amendment analysis. Speakers, listeners, and society at large
all suffer when the peculiar features of a regulatory scheme
have a "chilling effect" on persons that causes them to forgo
protected expression rather than get themselves enmeshed in
the scheme. Since the early 1960s the Supreme Court has relied heavily, perhaps too much so, on this phenomenon of selfcensorship as a basis for invalidating laws that regulate
speech.5 5 It is easier to speculate about the possible unintended inhibitory effects of a law than to explain why its intended effects violate the first amendment. Particularly when
the issue is the propriety of procedures, the self-censorship rationale is inviting. the Court need not characterize a procedure
55. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1976); Gibson v.

Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See generally
Schauer, supra note 15; Note, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69
CoLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).

1981]

THEORY OF PRIOR RESTRAINT

as unfair in the sense of tending to generate improper results,
only as too burdensome. It is a sign of the times that all the
leading writers on prior restraint in the last decade-Bickel,
Fiss, Barnett, Kalven, Litwack, Murphy, Schauer-have treated
the self-censorship phenomenon as either the exclusive or the
central consideration in deciding whether prior restraints
56
should be disfavored.
All laws regulating speech, criminal prohibitions and civil
liability rules no less than other procedures, are designed to
have one sort of "chilling effect": to deter persons from engaging in speech activities the ill effects of which are a legitimate
basis for imposing regulatory restraints or sanctions. Moreover, even the most narrowly designed laws are bound to induce a measure of self-censorship of protected expression, at
least so long as it takes some amount of time, effort and/or
money to vindicate one's rights. The question to be examined
is whether as a general matter the licensing system and the injunction induce significantly more self-censorship of speech
that is protected under prevailing first amendment standards
than the criminal prohibition and the civil liability rule. The
proposition is stated vividly by Professor Bickel: "A criminal
57
statute chills, prior restraint freezes."
The term "self-censorship" is used to describe a multiplicity of behavioral effects. Some would-be speakers may forgo
speech that arguably is not even prohibited by the statute or
injunction in question, simply because out of an abundance of
caution they wish to "steer far [wide] of the unlawful zone."5 8
Other speakers may forgo only speech that is clearly prohibited
by the statute or injunction, but may fail to mount a constitutional challenge to the state's regulatory endeavor. A third
group of speakers may pursue their constitutional remedy for a
time, but eventually may alter or abandon their speech plans
as a result of becoming enmeshed in the process of litigation.
In each of these instances the quality or quantity of communication is diminished even though the speech in question may
be constitutionally protected. There is reason, therefore, to
consider these various behavioral effects together under an om56. See A. BicKEL, supra note 52, at 61; 0. FtSS, supra note 13, at 69-74; Barnett, supra note 14, at 558-60; Kalven, supra note 2, at 34-35; Idtwack, supra note
51, at 549-54; Murphy, The PriorRestraintDoctrine in the Supreme Court"A Reevaluation, 51 NomE DAm LAw. 898, 906-07, 910-15, (1976); Schauer, supra note
15, at 694-701.
57. A. BicKEL, supra note 52, at 61.
58. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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nibus concept like self-censorship, so long as the disparate
strands can be separated when the analysis requires.
Self-censorship can be caused by many factors. Certainly a
law's substantive features have a great deal to do with how
much self-censorship it induces. Procedural features also can
be expected to have an impact. Thus, the notion of self-censorship can serve as a kind of common denominator in first
amendment analysis. Self-censorship effects that stem from diverse causes can be added up, and the collective impacts in this
regard of the various procedures for regulating speech can be
compared. What matters, therefore, is not whether each distinct cause of self-censorship is shared by licensing systems
and injunctions, but whether in general those two forms of
speech regulation share the quality of being especially inhibitory of protected expression. The ultimate proposition, it must
be remembered, is not just that licensing systems and injunctions are comparable in terms of the self-censorship they engender, but also that they are significantly more burdensome in
this regard than the prototypical subsequent punishments.
This last proposition is by no means self-evident. In some
respects, licensing systems and injunctions seem preferable to
criminal prohibitions and civil liability rules in terms of minimizing the deterrence of protected expression. Under a regime
of criminal or civil sanctions, speakers ordinarily can test the
limits of first amendment protection only by engaging in
speech and risking sanctions should they guess wrong about
the extent of their rights. Under a licensing procedure, in contrast, speakers can obtain a definitive ruling that their proposed
acts of expression are constitutionally protected. Injunction
procedures also provide for advance adjudication of speakers'
rights. Although that adjudication will not invariably determine the extent of the state's power to impose subsequent
sanctions for the speech in question, in most instances the
speakers will learn a great deal from the injunction procedure
regarding what acts of expression can be undertaken with
impunity.
Under systems of subsequent punishment, the risk of selfcensorship due to uncertainty is likely to be compounded by
the potential severity of the sanctions that can be imposed
against speakers. Except in the area of defamation, and there
only in one limited respect, the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to erect constitutional limitations on how severely
persons can be sanctioned for engaging in unprotected expres-
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sion.59 Long criminal sentences and enormous civil damage
awards are not uncommon, even for speech at the margins of
constitutional protection. 60 Persons who violate permit requirements and injunctions can also be punished severely, but usually not for guessing wrong about the extent of their rights,
only for failing to utilize available procedures for determining
in advance the limits of those rights. Moreover, sanctions for
the violation of injunctions and permit ordinances tend to be
light in comparison with those commonly administered under
the subsequent punishment regimes.61
Thus, even if licensing systems and injunctions are found
to share the quality of causing considerable self-censorship in
distinctive (though not identical) ways, the case is not necessarily compelling for basing a theory of prior restraint on this
particular common feature. Such a theory would be viable only
if the collective self-censorship effects of each "prior" form of
regulation were to exceed the considerable self-censorship effects that can be traced to the distinctive features of criminal
and civil sanctions.
I now examine several features of the two "prior" regulatory regimes that might cause significant self-censorship. I assess the importance of each feature for licensing systems,
injunctions, and where appropriate for the subsequent punishment regimes as well. Some of these features that may cause
self-censorship might also be objectionable on other grounds,
such as the tendency to generate undesirable substantive decisions regarding what speech is protected by the first amendment. It is a great mistake to think about prior restraint
exclusively in terms of alleged chilling effects. Those other
grounds will be examined later to see whether they provide a
59. The exception is in the area of defamation, where the Court has held
that punitive damages may not be assessed absent reckless disregard for the
truth on the part of the defendant. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974). In his memorable dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919), Justice Holmes argued that the defendant's conduct was protected, but
also observed that "the most nominal punishment seems to me all that could
possibly be inflicted." Id. at 629. The actual sentence was twenty years. This
intimation of a first amendment limitation on the severity of criminal sanctions
has never been taken up, to my knowledge.
60. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) ($460,000);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ($500,000); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (eighteen to twenty years); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919) (ten years).
61. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 312 (1967) (five
days in jail and a $50 fine, the maximum sentence permitted by Alabama law);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447 (1938) (fifty days or $50).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:11

basis for linking injunctions with licensing systems. For the
moment, however, the concern is only with how the features to
be discussed relate to the "common denominator" of selfcensorship.
A.

THE BURDEN OF INITIATIVE

We may assume that on occasion licensing systems have a
chilling effect on protected expression by the way they shift the
burden of initiative: some persons would rather forgo the opportunity to engage in protected expression than take the time
and trouble to obtain the required permit. It is difficult to generalize about this phenomenon, however. For many activities
that require a permit, a great deal of organizational or entrepreneurial effort is necessary quite apart from the demands
of the licensing procedure. Film exhibitors and parade organizers, for example, need attend to so many details that the
incremental burden represented by the need to file a permit application seems negligible. The burden of initiative is likely to
matter most in the case of unsophisticated speakers who are
intimidated by the prospect of a bureaucratic encounter, religious groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses whose tenets forbid
seeking advance permission to spread the word of God,62 and
persons who are fired by a fleeting impulse to speak out on
some matter of the moment. Licensing systems that require
every small detail of a communicative activity to be approved
might have an especially broad self-censorship impact as
speakers may often decide that desired last-minute changes are
not worth the bother of submitting a revised permit application. 63 Thus, the burden of initiative imposed by licensing systems should be a highly variable factor in the self-censorship
calculus, but probably exerts a significant effect in enough contexts to justify the conclusion that licensing systems are somewhat problematic on this count.
Can the same be said for injunctions? Under the collateral
bar rule, the issuance of an injunction shifts the burden of initiative onto the would-be speakers. They must institute judicial
proceedings to vacate or modify the injunction; failure to do so
results in a forfeiture of the right to speak, even when their
contemplated acts of expression are constitutionally protected.
The net effect of the collateral bar rule is that the issuance of
an injunction may engender in the persons against whom it is
62. Lovell v. Griffn, 303 U.S. 444, 448 (1938).
63. See J. MILTON, supra note 50, at 179.
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directed a certain degree of self-censorship in the same manner
as under a licensing system: by mobilizing the force of inertia
on the side of suppression.
The two procedures are not quite analogous, however, in
terms of the self-censorship phenomenon. Once a licensing
system is established, it operates continually until repealed.
Officials do not have to take action repeatedly to effect the shift
in the burden of initiative. When speech is regulated by injunction, in contrast, the burden remains on the would-be suppressors of speech (government or private parties) until they have
taken the trouble to sue for the injunction and satisfied the burden of proof to justify its issuance. Thus, under a licensing system, a burden of initiative is routinely imposed on all persons
who would like to engage in the expressive activity that is subject to the permit requirement, whereas under an injunctive
system only selected potential speakers are so burdened.
Once an injunction issues, it is true, the burden of initiative
disfavors the speakers just as under a licensing system. Moreover, the burden that enjoined potential speakers must discharge is more severe than that represented by the obligation
to submit a permit application. To vacate an injunction, a
speaker must go to court; the assistance of counsel is a practical necessity. In most licensing systems, the permit application
process is far less imposing. If the comparison is between the
stages of the two procedures at which speakers first have to
take the initiative, the broader impact of licensing systems
would seem to be offset to some extent by the possibly more
pronounced impact of injunctions.
On the other hand, speakers under injunction may represent a specialized population that is less likely, as compared
with the population of potential speakers subject to a licensing
system, to be deterred from speaking by an adverse burden of
initiative. Passive or tentative persons are seldom enjoined.
Usually, injunctions issue in response to controversial acts of
expression or noteworthy preparations to speak or publish.
Persons who have overcome their inertia enough to provoke an
injunction can normally be expected to exploit whatever procedures are available for lifting the restraint. No doubt some
speakers faced with the threat or reality of an injunction decide
to abandon their expressive projects. Speakers who are neither
zealous nor driven by the profit motive, and those who do not
have ready access to competent legal advice, are likely to be
deterred the most. Given the specialized nature of the relevant
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population, however, one might question whether as a general
matter inertia is a major factor contributing to the self-censorship effect of injunctions.
There is something to this point, but only if we take as
given the current sparing use of the injunction as a method of
social control. That sparing use may itself be partly a function
of the doctrine of prior restraint. One can imagine a world in
which anti-speech injunctions were sought and issued with regularity; subpoenas to compel the testimony of news reporters
were once a rarity.64 Were injunctions against speech to become more commonplace, the population of enjoinees would
become less specialized and probably more prone to self-censorship. Thus, one who adopts a pathological framework for
thinking about first amendment questions-a course I have advocated elsewhere 65-should accord only a small amount of significance to the fact that currently the kinds of persons who are
enjoined not to speak are not easily deterred by a burden of initiative. From the pathological perspective, the burden of initiative can be a distinctive source of self-censorship in both
licensing and injunctive systems.
B. DELAY
Under a licensing system, speakers who have no qualms
about taking the initiative and are not troubled by the time and
effort required to draft a permit application may nonetheless
censor themselves on account of the delays that are inherent in
the licensing process. Self-censorship from this source could
take two forms. The speakers might decide not to apply for a
permit because they anticipate that by the time the permit is
issued the occasion for speaking will have passed. Alternatively, they might apply for a permit and even contest a denial
in court, but lose their enthusiasm for speaking as a result of
the delay to which they have been subjected.
Under the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland,66 licensing officials cannot sit on permit applications in64. For a discussion of the social forces that led to a geometric increase in
the practice of subpoenaing news reporters, see Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:
An EmpiricalStudy, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971).
65. Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AB. FouNDATnON RESEAHCH J. 521.

66. 380 U.S. 57 (1965). In violation of a Maryland statute, the appellant exhibited a film without first submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors for approval. The Court held that a statute requiring prior submission
must provide certain procedural safeguards:
First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
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definitely. Instead, officials must "within a specified brief
period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain [the proposed expression]."67 In addition, "the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent
effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license." 68 There is every reason to believe that the Freedman
standards, formulated in the context of film censorship, are required of all licensing systems that regulate any form of pro69
tected expression.
The procedures required by Freedman minimize the impact of delay. By no means, however, do they eliminate all delay created self-censorship, for even short delays can be
discouraging in certain circumstances. Moreover, there is no
requirement in Freedman that the appellate process be expedited; permit applicants who lose the first round of court proceedings can face indefinite delays, at least in theory.70 At
some point, no doubt, the permit applicants would be permitted
to engage in self-help, but the court decisions do not specify
when. 7 ' In contrast, criminal prohibitions and civil liability
rules always permit speakers to engage in self-help, to speak at
must rest on the censor... Second, while the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all
showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor's
determination whether a film constitutes protected expression...
[O]nly a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.... [TJhe exhibitor must be assured...
that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a li... [Finally,] the
cense or go to court to restrain showing the fil.
procedure must also assure a prompt final decision, to minimize the
deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a
license.
Id. at 60.
67. Id. at 59.
68. Id.
69. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
70. In National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977),
the Court held in a brief per curiam opinion that injunctions against speech
must be stayed if they are not subject to expeditious appellate review. The
Court cited Freedman v. Maryland by way of analogy, perhaps suggesting that
the Justices now read Freedman to require expeditious appellate review.
71. In Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), the Court held that a
prospective speaker who is denied a permit must challenge the denial in court
rather than by means of self-help. The defendant raised the spectre of a long
delay, possibly lasting years, before his rights could be fully adjudicated. The
Court was unmoved. "Delay is unfortunate, but the expense and annoyance of
litigation is a price citizens must pay for life in an orderly society where the
rights of the First Amendment have a real and abiding meaning." Id. at 409.
Justice Frankfurter limited his concurrence to the situation in which there is
available prompt judicial redress for a wrongful permit denial. Id. at 420.
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the most desired time and be held to account later. In that regard, licensing systems can be viewed as more conducive to
self-censorship than the standard subsequent punishments.
Injunctions may engender delay created self-censorship on
account of the collateral bar rule. Enjoined speakers must hold
their tongues while they move to have the injunction vacated or
modified. The delay imposed by that obligation cannot be too
extended, however, because the Supreme Court has held that
states must either stay injunctions against speech or provide
an expeditious procedure for vacating them.7 2 Under Walker,
moreover, a speaker who meets with "delay or frustration" in
seeking to vacate an injunction need not forgo speaking indefinitely.73 At some point, self-help is permissible. In the context
of mass demonstrations that require special arrangements and
the coordination of numerous people, that point presumably is
reached when the marchers' motion to vacate has not been
ruled upon by the time of the scheduled march. Walker does
not specify, however, whether enjoined marchers can keep to
their original schedule by engaging in self-help if their motion
to vacate has been denied but is pending on appeal on the date
of the planned march.7 4 Nor is it clear when, if ever, self-help is
permissible for an enjoined film exhibitor desiring to meet an
advertised opening date or an enjoined newspaper desiring to
publish a topical article. The uncertainty that surrounds both
licensing systems and injunctions regarding the permissibility
of self-help is itself a possible cause of self-censorship on the
part of speakers who are concerned about delay.
If self-help doctrines were to emerge that were both reasonably clear and similar for the two procedures, delay costs
would probably be more serious in the case of injunctions. Permit applicants sometimes can take the possibility of litigational
delay into account in timing their applications. Enjoined
speakers typically have less control over when the legal issue is
joined, and may be discouraged or incapacitated by unexpected
delays. On the other hand, frequently an injunction simply orders speakers not to repeat the communicative activity that
provoked the injunction in the first place. Timing may be less
important in the case of encores, and hence have little impact
on self-censorship.
72.
(1977).
73.

See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skolde, 432 U.S. 43
388 U.S. at 318-19; see note 45 supra.

74. For a detailed discussion of this interpretative question, see Blasi,
PriorRestraintson Demonstrations,68 MIcL I. REV. 1481 (1970).
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On the whole, the disallowance of self-help under both licensing and injunction regimes constitutes a common feature
of some significance. Although one can never be certain about
the impact of delay, it is plausible that on some occasions persons who lose control over the timing of their utterances
thereby lose their desire to speak. Self-censorship of this variety does not operate under the subsequent punishment
regimes.
C. FEAR OF BIAs
Concern about the biases of administrative censors has always been a prominent part of the case against licensing
speech.7 5 Similar bureaucratic biases do not plague the injunction process, but other biases can operate, such as the personal
affront judges may feel when their injunctions are disobeyed.
If these bureaucratic and judicial biases could be shown to
share features of importance in first amendment theory, the
phenomenon of decision making bias might figure directly in a
theory of prior restraint. At this stage, however, the concern is
with the indirect effects of possible bias: the self-censorship
that perceived bias on the part of licensing officials and judges
might engender. For this purpose, it is not important whether
the biases of the two types of decision makers are similar in nature, or even whether such biases exist at all. What matters is
whether this possible source of (perhaps irrational) self-censorship should be taken into account in computing the overall
toll of self-censorship for each regulatory form.
With regard to licensing systems, the fear of administrative
bias reduces in theory to a concern for delay. For under Freedman no would-be speaker can be denied a permit by a licensing official: the official must go to court to get a judicial order
validating the permit denial.7 6 Even under a licensing system,
therefore, the actual decision-maker is a judge; the administrative censor's power is only to disallow speech pending expeditious adjudication. Of course, in practice a decision by a
licensing official not to grant a permit may be given some deference by judges, contrary to an explicit provision of the Freedman doctrine. 77 More importantly, potential speakers often
will be unaware of the Freedman procedures. In deciding
whether to forgo possibly protected speech rather than do what
75. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 3, at 658.
76. See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
77. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 57, 58 (1965).
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it takes to get a permit, speakers are likely to focus on the attitudes they perceive in the administrative officials to whom they
must apply in the first instance.
These practical considerations are difficult to assess. They
would seem to vary greatly with the content and form of the
speech in dispute, the identity of the licensing officials, the
quality of legal advice available to the speakers, and the incentives (financial or otherwise) impelling the permit applications.
For example, a parks commissioner's decision not to allow a
mass demonstration on account of the competing uses that
would be displaced is likely to receive more deference from a
court than a film censorship board's judgment to suppress a
film on grounds of obscenity. Similarly, the perception wouldbe speakers have of likely administrative bias in the processing
of parade permit applications might depend on whether that
administrative task is assigned to the police department, the
parks commission, or the city council, as well as on the current
state of relations in the municipality between public officials
and dissidents. High profit exhibitors of x-rated films are likely
to know all about Freedman v. Maryland, and to be inured to
any biases they may perceive in the local film licensing board.
In short, self-censorship traceable to the fear of bias in licensing systems should be regarded as highly dependent on context. If a generalization must be hazarded, the phenomenon
should probably be viewed as neither negligible nor highly
significant.
For injunctions the dynamics of self-censorship due to the
fear of bias would seem not to vary so much with context. The
potentially biased officials are all judges, and traditional equity
procedures add a note of regularity and accountability to the
decision making process. Nevertheless, some judges no doubt
are influenced on occasion by personal hostility to certain.
speakers or points of view. Since both motions to vacate and
proceedings for contempt are typically heard by the same judge
who issued the injunction in the first place,78 any judicial bias
that appears is likely to permeate the injunctive process. The
antidote for a victimized speaker is an appeal, either from the
denial of a motion to vacate or from a contempt conviction. But
appeals take time and money, and some appellate judges will
probably be inclined to support their lower court brethren if
the conduct of the speaker can be viewed in any way as a challenge to judicial authority. It is reasonable to assume that
78. See 0. Fiss, supra note 13, at 30-31.
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some speakers are deterred from pursuing their constitutional
claims by the bias they perceive in the judge at the issuance
stage of the injunctive proceedings.
Of course, the fear of bias can also cause self-censorship
under the subsequent punishment regimes. If police or prosecutors in a locality are perceived as hostile to certain forms of
expression-sexually explicit films, for example, or civil rights
protests-some potential speakers will no doubt choose the
path of silence. Social stigma and potentially heavy sentences
make criminal prosecution an especially intimidating prospect
for most persons. When the criminal process, the ultimate assertion of state authority, is perceived as breaking down due to
prosecutorial or judicial bias, the intimidating effect on speakers is likely to be greater than when licensing or injunctive
processes are so perceived.
It might be contended, however, that bias is endemic to licensing and the injunctive process, but only an occasional
problem in the realm of criminal prosecutions. If that were
true, the self-censorship rationale for linking injunctions with
licensing systems would be strengthened. There is little reason
to believe, however, that bias is so endemic to the prior forms
of regulation, and so exceptional in the subsequent punishment
regimes. More importantly, there is no reason to believe that
potential speakers view licensing systems and injunctions as
being more plagued by bias than the criminal process. Although the fear of prosecutorial and adjudicative bias is probably one of the most significant causes of self-censorship under
all regulatory regimes, it is doubtful whether the prior forms of
regulation are especially problematic in this regard.
D.

PERSONALIZATION

Injunctions and licensing systems have a personalized
quality that is not fully shared by the subsequent punishment
regimes. Speakers who are enjoined are told, typically in personal terms, not to engage in particular acts of expression. Permit applicants whose requests are refused are personally told
that their proposed communicative activities are officially disapproved. Criminal and civil defendants get a lot of personal
attention as well, but usually only after the time when self-censorship is possible. At the stage in the regulatory process when
the behavior of speakers might be affected, the subsequent
punishment regimes speak in impersonal terms. This difference may go far to explain why the prior forms of regulation
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are commonly thought to cause more self-censorship than the
subsequent punishment regimes.
To analyze the specific impact of personalization in injunctive and licensing proceedings, it is necessary to define selfcensorship precisely. "Self-censorship" in the form of a
speaker's unwillingness to violate the clear terms of an injunction or speak without a required permit should be of no concern so long as a collateral bar rule is operative. Even though
the communications that are thereby lost might have qualified
for first amendment protection in terms of their content and
consequences, an analysis that accepts the legitimacy of the
collateral bar principle should not count as a cost the eschewing of self-help under circumstances when that remedy is disallowed. Properly to be considered in assessing the selfcensorship effects of personalization, however, is the unwillingness of prospective speakers either to contest the validity or
test the limits of injunctions and permit denials. Persons who
choose the path of silence in.this way have forsaken the opportunity to engage in what might be determined to be constitutionally authorized forms and procedures of expression.
As a general matter, one might expect less self-censorship
from the personalized nature of permit denials than from the
personalized nature of injunctions, for two reasons. First, at
the stage of the licensing process when a personalized judgment is first issued, the next move is up to the licensing authorities, who are required to go to court and discharge the burden
of persuasion to have the denial validated.79 Rejected permit
applicants can always decide not to contest the government at
this stage, but the normal procedural dynamics encourage the
speakers to join issue and assert their constitutional claims.
The burdens and dynamics cut in just the opposite direction in
the case of injunctions: when the personalized admonition is.
issued, the next move is up to the speakers. Second, when the
personalized order is first issued in the licensing context, the
speakers ordinarily have not yet had a chance to argue their
case. They can be expected to challenge the permit denial
partly out of a desire to be heard. In contrast, in the case of
non-interlocutory injunctions, the prototype for the present
analysis, a full adversary hearing precedes any personalized order. Speakers who have already lost one day in court may be
somewhat chary about pressing on with their constitutional
79. This is one of the requirements of Freedmanv. Maryland, discussed at
note 66 supra.
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contentions. These are general considerations that should play
some role in all the various self-censorship scenarios relating to
personalization. A more particularized comparison of injunctions and licensing systems can be undertaken if we examine
separately the different ways in which the personalized nature
of the legal command may cause speakers who are enjoined or
refused a permit to comply with the restraint rather than challenge it in a manner permitted by law.
The phenomenon of personalization has at least three consequences that might induce self-censoring compliance. First,
a personal admonition brings the existence of a legal prohibition and the possibility of sanctions directly to the attention of
the potential speaker. Awareness can engender compliance.
Second, personalization may in fact increase the likelihood that
a violation of the restraint on speaking will be prosecuted, a
factor that should loom large in the calculations of any person
who contemplates testing the limits of a restrictive legal obligation. Third, the phenomenon of personalization can induce
compliance by contributing to the mystique of a legal norm. To
understand how the personalized character of injunctions and
licensing systems might cause self-censorship, it is necessary
to examine how each of these consequences might affect the
behavior of potential speakers who are enjoined or refused a
permit.
Some injunctions doubtless bring the possibility of sanctions to the attention of potential speakers who might otherwise sally forth on their expressive ventures in blissful
ignorance. Moreover, even speakers who would have been informed in any event about the pertinent laws restricting speech
might be more preoccupied by the threat of sanctions after receiving the rebuke that is implicit in an injunction. Levels of
awareness and consciousness have much to do with a person's
or group's inhibitions.
However, so long as some instances of communication can
legitimately be prohibited, not all the speech that is lost as a
result of heightened awareness on the part of potential speakers can be counted a cost. The concept of self-censorship relates only to the loss of constitutionally protected expression.
Furthermore, we might expect the toll extracted by awareness
alone-apart from such other considerations as the burden of
initiative and delay-to vary inversely with the strength of the
self-censor's first amendment claim. Enjoined speakers who
have strong constitutional claims should not be deterred from
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asserting them via motions to vacate simply by the knowledge
that some officials and one judge disapprove the intended
communication.
Of course, would-be speakers confronted with injunctions
know for certain that their proposed communications are officially disapproved but can only speculate about whether they
are constitutionally protected. Under the subsequent punishment regimes, in contrast, potential speakers ordinarily must
speculate on both counts. In this respect, the more precise information available to speakers under the injunctive method of
regulation may induce a measure of self-censorship of constitutionally protected communications.
On the other hand, traditional self-censorship doctrine is
concerned primarily with the inhibitions that are engendered
when speakers are uncertain whether their proposed acts of expression are officially disapproved.80 The void-for-vagueness
doctrine and one major aspect of the overbreadth doctrine reflect that concern. 81 Precisely because they are personalized,
injunctions can be tailored to fit exactly the situation that originally gave rise to the regulatory impulse, thereby giving enjoined speakers an especially informative delineation of the
line between what officials regard as the permissible and the
forbidden. As compared with the subsequent punishment regimes, the injunctive method of regulating speech should
engender much less of that highly costly variant of self-censorship whereby speakers who prefer to steer wide of the danger
zone forgo communicative activities that would not even be disapproved by the regulators. The greater awareness of legal restraints created by the personalized character of injunctions
thus cuts both ways. It is questionable whether the net balance of self-censorship effects stemming from that greater
awareness supports a presumption against the injunction as a
method of regulating speech.
A similar analysis holds for permit denials. The existence
80. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
81. Vagueness is problematic largely because persons potentially subject
to regulation cannot be certain what activities are prohibited. The overbreadth
doctrine has a vagueness component because if a prohibition covers many ac-

tivities that are constitutionally protected it cannot be applied according to its
full terms but rather must be applied more restrictively, an interpretative practice that is bound to leave persons guessing about what are the operative limits
of the judicially ',redrafted" prohibition. See generally the excellent primer on
vagueness and overbreadth in W. LocKHART, Y. KAMISAI, &J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

353-61 (5th ed. 1981).
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of a licensing system does not guarantee that every would-be
speaker will know about its requirements, no more than does
the existence of a criminal prohibition or civil liability rule generate universal awareness. However, the category of potential
self-censors consists only of persons who are aware of the permit requirement and possibly daunted by it. The phenomenon
of personalization is likely to affect such persons in conflicting
ways so far as greater awareness is concerned.
On the one hand, the experience of having a permit application rejected by an administrative official or panel tells a
would-be speaker that the civil authorities disapprove of the
proposed communication and will seek to prevent its occurrence. On the other hand, a license is a kind of passport; the
possibility of receiving a license, if only by virtue of a court order, might encourage some persons to pursue controversial expressive ventures they would not risk in the absence of some
form of immunity from subsequent punishment. Moreover, rejected applicants often are told how to modify their plans in order to achieve official indulgence; speakers seldom possess that
reassuring awareness under systems of subsequent
punishment.
Thus, as with injunctions, it seems unlikely that the informing function of licensing systems engenders more self-censorship than it prevents. If anything, since the issuance of a
permit grants speakers more of an immunity from prosecution
than does the negative inference created by the outer boundary
of an injunction, there is even more reason in the case of licensing systems to regard the net effect of the awareness factor
as emboldening to speakers rather than inhibiting.
A second consequence of personalization that may induce
self-censorship is the high probability that a violation of a personalized prohibition against speaking will be prosecuted.
Such a high probability should make some speakers engage in
that form of self-censorship that consists of steering far wide of
the danger zone by resolving all interpretive doubts in favor of
the broadest possible view of the prohibition. A high likelihood
of prosecution should not, however, deter potential speakers
from bringing motions to vacate injunctions or from seeking to
have permit denials overturned in court. In fact, persons who
know they will be prosecuted if they speak, and know they will
be barred from raising constitutional defenses in such a prosecution, should be spurred somewhat by that knowledge to seek
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anticipatory relief. The only form of self-censorship that need
concern us, therefore, is that of the "steering wide" variety.
Two aspects of personalization increase the likelihood that
violations of injunctions will be prosecuted. First, prosecuting
authorities may feel that they have already committed themselves regarding the particular communicative activities that
have been enjoined. Any arguable violation of the injunction
may be viewed by the general public as a challenge to judicial
authority. A firm response may seem imperative simply as a
matter of maintaining credibility, quite independent of whether
the activity in question caused any harm. Second, precisely because the command of the prohibition on speaking is stated in
personal terms and defiance would raise symbolic concerns,
the issuance of an injunction may cause enforcement authorities to pay special attention to the enjoined speakers. Apart
from any official predisposition to prosecute, the mere fact of
heightened scrutiny increases the likelihood that the authorities will learn about prohibited actions on the part of speakers,
a separate element affecting the odds of prosecution. Enjoined
speakers who perceive a high risk of prosecution on either of
these accounts are likely to steer wide of the danger zone in interpreting the prohibitions contained in an injunction.
It is significant, however, that the only type of self-censorship that may be affected by the increased risk of prosecution
depends on the speaker's uncertainty regarding the exact scope
of the prohibition. Precisely because of their personalized nature, injunctions can be drawn to minimize this uncertainty. In
this regard, the self-censorship danger stemming from the likelihood of prosecution, while by no means negligible, is not necessarily endemic to the injunctive procedure as such, and thus
should not figure prominently in a theory of prior restraint.
In the case of licensing systems, the likelihood of prosecution due to personalization should not be a factor inducing selfcensorship. The "steering wide" phenomenon, the only variety
of self-censorship that might be affected by an increase in the
likelihood of prosecution, seems not to be a consideration for licensing systems. In this context, the obligation of speakers is
not to obey a possibly ambiguous prohibition, but rather to secure unambiguous official approval for a particular activity. Potential speakers who are influenced by the perception that any
violations of the prohibition on speaking will surely be noticed
and prosecuted should be no less likely on that account to engage in constitutionally protected expression. For the only way
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speakers can engage in such expression is by securing the required permit, a procedure free from ambiguity precisely because of its personalized nature. Communicative activities
undertaken in defiance of permit requirements may not always
warrant prosecution, but such expression should not be considered constitutionally protected for purposes of a self-censorship analysis.
Thus, the impact on prosecutorial practices that may stem
from the personalized character of injunctions and permit denials would seem not to be an important source of self-censorship. An increased likelihood of prosecution is highly plausible
in both regimes, but the only type of self-censorship that is
likely to result thereby should not be a major concern due to
other features of the injunctive and licensing processes.
Finally, the personalized nature of the prior forms of regulation may induce self-censorship simply as a matter of mystique. Certainly injunctions appear to have in the minds of
many citizens a mystique that engenders compliance. Potential speakers who would think nothing of violating criminal
laws in order to test their constitutionality or even as exercises
in civil disobedience are reluctant to disobey injunctions. The
personalized nature of the law's command seems to cast a
spell.
It is important, but difficult, to distinguish this factor of
mystique from the other considerations that have been discussed. Speakers who comply more readily with injunctions
than with criminal prohibitions may not know in their own
minds why they behave that way. Injunctions may have a mystique largely because they raise the awareness levels of speakers, or because the high likelihood of expeditious prosecution
enhances respect for the law. In the one area where violations
of injunctions routinely are not prosecuted, public employee
strikes, no mystique seems to operate; persons who have a considerable occupational stake in the rule of law defy injunctions
82
with regularity and seeming ease.
Despite the acute difficulty of untangling the many strands
of behavioral motivation, there is impressionistic evidence to
support the claim that injunctions have a special mystique. In
the controversy over the Pentagon Papers, for example, the
New York Times published classified documents in the face of
threats of criminal prosecution, but stated that it would obey
82. See, e.g., the empirical study reported in Douglas, The LaborInjunction:
Enjoining Public Sector Strikes in New York, 31 LAB. L.J., 340 (1980).
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an injunction against publication.8 3 The Progressive magazine
sat on its bombshell story for months until an injunction was
lifted.84 Taft-Hartley injunctions appear in some contexts to
have an almost unaccountable behavioral impact on strikers,
despite the controversial history of the injunction in labor relations.85 Perhaps the mystique traces not simply to the fact that
would-be violators are identified by name, but also to the perception that the injunction is the government's ultimate plea
for cooperation, defiance of which assumes the dimensions of a
revolutionary act. This consideration should be especially important to protestors seeking to appeal to public opinion. It
may also be significant that the violation of an injunction challenges the authority of the courts rather than the executive and
legislative branches. Those who view the judiciary as the protector of minorities or the central bulwark against abuses of official power should have mixed emotions about nibbling at the
foundations of judicial authority. The phenomenon of personalization thus may not be the only reason why injunctions have a
mystique. Whatever the forces that contribute to the effect,
however, it would be hard to deny that injunctions often seem
to induce obedience that cannot be explained fully by Holmes's
86
bad man theory of law.
Obedience is not synonymous with the self-censorship of
protected expression, however. Speakers who are influenced
by the mystique of an injunction to file a motion to vacate
rather than engage in unauthorized self-help should not be considered self-censors. In the examples cited above, the "compliance" of the New York Times and The Progressive took the
form of eschewing self-help while pursuing motions to vacate.
These publications "censored" themselves from being civil disobedients, but not from being first amendment speakers. Civil
disobedience may properly figure in a theory of prior restraint,
a question to be discussed in a subsequent section,8 7 but the
concept of self-censorship that has played such a prominent
83. See 0. Fiss, supra note 13, at 71.
84. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979),
appealdismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979); Knoll, Born Secret-The Story Behind the H-bomb Article We're Not Allowed to Print, THE PROGRESSIVE, May
1979, at 12. See generally I. MoRLAND, THE SECRET THAT EXPLODED (1981).
85. See LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO END STmRxEs:

A

DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY 575-609

(1967).
86.

O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167

(1920).
87.

See text accompanying notes 135-36 infra.
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role in modern first amendment doctrine extends only to the
loss of communications that are constitutionally protected. On
occasion, acts of civil disobedience can have social utility, but
by definition they cannot enjoy constitutional protection. The
mystique of injunctions thus can figure in the present analysis
only if that mystique induces persons to steer excessively wide
of the terms of a prohibition or not to pursue opportunitites to
vacate or modify it.
On this score, it is not clear that injunctions possess a behavior-modifying mystique. Mystique, if it exists at all as an independent force, has impact largely by inducing respect for
law. There is nothing disrespectful about filing a motion to vacate; if anything, such an act signals the highest respect for law,
much more so than a resentful or fatalistic abandonment of
plans to speak. Moreover, a person under injunction who proceeds to speak because he believes or hopes that his particular
communication is not prohibited by the terms of the restraint is
not being disrespectful of law. Self-help is the authorized procedure for testing the limits, though not the constitutional validity, of an injunction. It can be a risky procedure, so
considerations such as the likelihood of prosecution ought to
affect the behavior of speakers in this respect. But there is no
reason why the mystique phenomenon should play a role at
this point in the process. Thus, despite the strong intuitive
sense that injunctions have a special mystique due in part to
personalization, it is unlikely that a significant quantity of selfcensorship of protected expression results from that mystique.
In the case of licensing systems, the mystique phenomenon
appears to play no role whatever. Permit denials may be personalized in character, but in our legal culture they carry no
mystique. It is inconceivable that an applicant who is denied a
permit should fail to challenge that denial in court out of some
special regard for the decision or authority of the licensing officials. Like the other possible consequences of personalization
discussed in this subsection, mystique is not, it would seem, an
important source of self-censorship in either system of prior
regulation.

E. EXPEDrIous ENFORCEMENT
Injunctions are enforced by means of a uniquely expeditious procedure: contempt of court. In contrast, licensing systems, criminal prohibitions, and civil liability rules are enforced
according to the normal procedures and timetables of the civil
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and criminal courts. The common perception that violations of
injunctions can be more swiftly and surely punished than other
types of violations may induce enjoined speakers to censor
themselves in certain ways. Such a possibility needs to be considered even though licensing systems, which are enforced by
standard criminal prosecutions for speaking without the required permit, do not share this source of self-censorship.
Since the concept of self-censorship is a common denominator
in the analysis, we are comparing the sum total of predictable
self-censorship for each regulatory method from all sources, including those unique to a particular method.
Do injunctions engender unusual self-censorship on account of the nature of their enforcement proceedings? A criminal prosecutor must contend with time-consuming screening
and pretrial procedures, the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard
of guilt, and, if the defendant chooses, the cumbersome and unpredictable phenomenon of jury trial. Punishment of violators
by this method is seldom either swift or sure, a fact that will
not be lost on at least some speakers who must decide whether
to engage in arguably protected expression. Similarly, plaintiffs invoking civil liability rules against speakers typically encounter long docket delays and, in the case of libel litigation
(the most common civil action relating to speech), special burdens of proof that make recovery an uncertain and distant
prospect.8 8 In contrast, prosecutions for contempt of court are
usually instituted and consummated within a short period after
the alleged violation takes place. By tradition, moreover, contempt proceedings are streamlined, with the judge (who has
ruled against the speakers at the issuance stage and who may
have instigated the prosecution) not always assuming the role
of an impartial arbiter.8 9 The swiftness and sureness of sanctions, not to mention the unpleasantness of the enforcement
proceedings themselves, would seem to be factors that should
influence the behavior of potential speakers.
The differences between the various enforcement procedures can be overstated, however. The only type of contempt
proceeding for which the collateral bar rule is applicable is
88. Proof of fault on the part of the defendant must be by clear and convincing evidence. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-92
(1964). In addition, summary judgment is frequently granted to protect defendants from the burden of litigation.
89. See 0. Fiss, supra note 13, at 30-31, 50.
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criminal contempt,9 0 and most of the safeguards of the Bill of
Rights apply to criminal contempt prosecutions. The presumption of innocence operates, proof of guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt, defendants may not be compelled to serve as
witnesses against themselves, and the rule against double jeopardy applies. 91 Should the punishment be six months or more,
defendants enjoy the right to a trial by jury.92 If the presiding
judge (who typically issued the injunction) can be shown to be
93
biased, the defendants are entitled to have a different judge.
The most striking differences between criminal prosecutions
and criminal contempt proceedings appear to be two: (1) the
much shorter lead time in the contempt procedure between the
alleged violation and the determination of guilt or innocence;
and (2) the greater possibility in contempt proceedings that
judges whose behavior is not so outrageous as to justify their
removal from the case will nonetheless be predisposed against
the defendant. Given the existence of appeals, which often provide a justification for sanctions being stayed and which can
check or countermand some instances of biased judging, it is
questionable whether many speakers are adversely affected by
the distinctive features of contempt procedures.
Whatever the objective reality may be, it is the perceptions
of would-be speakers concerning that reality that determine
the level of self-censorship. So long as contempt proceedings
are commonly perceived as Draconian, speakers can be expected to censor themselves more severely when contempt is
one of the sanctions at the disposal of the regulatory authorities. Here again, however, it is important to be specific about
the types of self-censorship that must be assessed. If one assumes the applicability and validity of the collateral bar rule, as
I do by hypothesis at this stage of the analysis, it should be of
no concern whether speakers are deterred by the fear of an expeditious contempt proceeding from resorting to self-help in
the face of a prohibitory injunction. That remedy is not available to them. The self-censorship effects that properly may be
counted as a cost relate to other patterns of behavior the
abandonment of plans to speak due to the mere threat of an in90. See, e.g., In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943); United States v. Spectro
Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1182 (3d Cir. 1976).

91. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S.
42 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
92. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
93. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); D. DOBBS, supra
note 53, at 96.
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junction, failure to exploit procedures for lifting or modifying
the injunction, and excessive caution in interpreting the scope
of the prohibition contained in the injunction.
It seems plausible that on occasion persons are deterred
from engaging in communicative activities by threats from the
government or private parties to seek an injunction against the
planned communication. A threat of this sort can be expected
to have a special impact if it contains the assertion that failure
on the part of the putative speakers to abandon their plans
could result in their being behind bars within a matter of days.
At present, there is no reason to believe that threats to enjoin
speech are issued frequently enough to have much of a quantitative impact on self-censorship. Should the enjoining of
speech become a more commonplace phenomenon, however,
threats of swift, expeditious contempt proceedings could seriously affect the overall level of self-censorship. Since I believe
worst-case scenarios should figure prominently in first amendment analysis, 94 I regard the expeditious enforcement procedures for injunctions as problematic on this account.
One must ask, however, whether injunctions are any worse
the
score of threat potential than the subsequent punishon
ment regimes. Law enforcement officials may not be able to exploit the factor of immediacy by frightening potential speakers
with credible threats of imminent criminal convictions, but
threats of imminent arrests ought to have considerable impact.
Such threats should have the highest credibility because their
implementation is fully in the hands of the prosecutorial authorities and does not depend, as is the case with threats of
contempt convictions, on judicial acquiescence. It would seem,
therefore, that the expeditious nature of their enforcement procedures does not distinguish injunctions from criminal prohibitions so far as the likely impact of threats at the earliest stages
of the regulatory process is concerned.
Might not the phenomenon of expeditious enforcement affect the behavior of speakers at the next stage of the process,
when the injunction actually is issued? At this stage, the possibility of a swift prosecution for contempt takes on a more concrete quality. The nature of the enforcement proceedings
might have considerable impact on speakers if the threat of an
actual prosecution is immediate and real.
The expeditious nature of contempt proceedings should not
deter enjoined speakers from moving to vacate or modify in94.

See Blasi, note 65 supra.
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junctions. The vivid threat of swift conviction if unauthorized
self-help is attempted makes such anticipatory litigation more
imperative for speakers but no more burdensome. If anything,
the immediacy of the threat of sanctions should act as a spur to
speakers to consider their legal options, including the possibility of a motion to vacate, all the more carefully.
On the other hand, self-censorship of the "steering wide"
sort could result if enjoined speakers, intimidated by the spectre of immediate sanctions, decided to comport themselves so
that by no stretch of the interpretive imagination could their
conduct be considered a violation of the terms of the injunction. This variety of self-censorship seems a likely consequence of the expeditious nature of contempt procedures so
long as enjoined speakers remain in some doubt regarding just
what activities are prohibited. Since injunctions have the potential, however, for minimizing that doubt by virtue of their
personalized quality, the self-censorship toll from this quarter
need not be heavy. Moreover, the proper antidote for any selfcensorship of the steering-wide variety that injunctions might
cause would seem to be a strict void-for-vagueness doctrine
rather than a comprehensive presumption against the injunctive form of regulation.
F.

CONCLUSION

I have examined five different sources of self-censorship
and have made some speculative judgments regarding the importance of each under the various major methods of speech
regulation. It is time to return to the ultimate question relating
to self-censorship as a rationale for prior restraint doctrine: do
licensing systems and injunctions that are governed by the collateral bar rule have in common the tendency to engender significantly more self-censorship than criminal prohibitions and
civil liability rules? My answer is no. I do not believe the
sources of self-censorship identified in the preceding analysis
are likely, in general, to have more of an inhibiting effect on potential speakers than the sources of self-censorship that are
distinctive to the subsequent punishment regimes.
Criminal prohibitions and civil liability rules often leave
potential speakers uncertain about what they can say with impunity. Generalized prohibitions almost always contain inherent ambiguities that even strict due process doctrines must
tolerate. More importantly, traditional doctrines of fair notice
in criminal cases and fault in civil actions require at most that
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defendants be informed about their statutory and common-law
obligations, not the limits of their constitutional rights. Under
the subsequent punishment regimes, the prescribed procedure
for having one's rights adjudicated is to engage in the prohibited activity, risking incarceration, fine, or liability in damages
should the constitutional judgment be adverse. Were declaratory judgments and injunctions against prosecution and civil
suit more readily available, this source of uncertainty could be
minimized. One thoughtful commentator has even argued that
prospective speakers should perhaps enjoy a first amendment
right to such anticipatory remedies. 9 5 Until such an innovative
right is recognized, however, or advance definitive rulings become available without constitutional compulsion, a considerable amount of self-censorship can be expected in the
subsequent punishment regimes due to the uncertainties inherent in their procedures. Injunctions and licensing systems
are far less problematic on this score because under those regimes the definitive adjudications take place before the speakers must decide whether or not to engage in the disputed
communicative activities.
I am also inclined to give weight to the factor of severity of
sanctions. Even though sentences for contempt of court and
speaking without a permit can be substantial, both types of offenses typically are punished lightly. Perhaps sentencing patterns are influenced to some extent by the fact that the
defendants are often persons whose communicative activities
would not warrant prosecution but for the need to make credible the prohibition on self-help. Whatever the cause, if sanctions tend to be more severe under subsequent punishment
systems, self-censorship should be more pronounced as a
result.
In light of the ways in which subsequent punishments may
cause more self-censorship than the prior methods of regulation, the case for building a theory of prior restraint on the selfcensorship rationale depends on identifying some distinctive
features of injunctions and licensing systems that can be expected to cause large amounts of self-censorship. I have considered several characteristics of injunctions and licensing
systems that might be supposed to engender self-censorship,
but on examination only two, the burden of initiative and delay,
can be said in net effect to impose serious and distinctive self95. See Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518,

543-51 (1970).
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censorship costs in certain contexts. Moreover, for both the
burden of initiative and delay, the predictable self-censorship
effects are confined to either a relatively narrow class of potential speakers or to a worst-case scenario that depends on a major alteration of current regulatory patterns. Neither of those
dangers of self-censorship should be dismissed as negligible,
but for purposes of comparison they would seem not to outweigh the self-censorship risks that derive from the greater uncertainties and more severe sanctions of the subsequent
punishment regimes.
V. ADJUDICATION IN THE ABSTRACT
If the common denominator of self-censorship is not a basis for a general presumption against licensing systems and injunctions, we must look to other features shared by the two
methods of speech regulation. One phenomenon common to licensing systems and injunctions governed by the collateral bar
rule is what might be termed adjudication in the abstract.
Under both systems, the final authoritative judicial decision regarding the legal status of a disputed communication takes
place before the moment of initial dissemination. That typically is not true under the subsequent punishment regimes.
When adjudication precedes initial dissemination, the communication cannot be judged by its actual consequences or
public reception. The adjudicative assessment of speech value
versus social harm must be made in the abstract, based on
speculation or generalizations embodied in presumptions. That
decisional limitation can affect the substance of the judicial decision in at least four ways that might be detrimental to the
claims put forth by speakers.
First, if the governing first amendment test for the speech
at issue is one that turns on consequences (clear and present
danger, for example), the necessity for speculation permits
groundless fears to figure in the rationale for suppression. If
the judgment were made at a later stage, the data from initial
dissemination could on occasion serve to dispel such fears.
The distorting influence of groundless fears is likely to be compounded, moreover, in disputes over such matters as diplomatic and military secrets and street demonstrations, when the
government may have control over the only witnesses who possess the information and expertise required to speculate intelli-
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gently about the dangers. 96
No doubt on occasion the need to speculate regarding the
impact of the speech will work to the advantage of first amendment claimants: communicative activities that might have
seemed harmless in the abstract will sometimes generate consequences that provide a rationale for holding the speakers
civilly or criminally liable. A central tenet of modern first
amendment theory, however, is that under conditions of uncertainty regarding consequences, both regulatory officials and
judges tend to overestimate the dangers of controversial
speech. 97 Unless that tenet is to be abandoned, it makes sense
to consider the net effect of adjudication before initial dissemination to be detrimental to speakers so far as the assessment of
dangers is concerned.
This objection to adjudication in the abstract does not apply when the first amendment test is based on the intrinsic
character of the speech rather than its particular consequences
(for example, the current doctrines regarding obscenity and
fighting words).98 Even if the "intrinsic character" of speech
categories is determined largely on the basis of generalizations
about the normal consequences of the various communications
that fall within each category, once the generalization is
adopted there is no further assessment based on the consequences in individual cases. It should not matter, therefore, so
far as the factor of groundless fears is concerned, whether adjudication under an intrinsic character standard precedes or follows the expressive event. Such intrinsic character standards
are rare and much criticized, however. 99 If the need to accommodate prior regulation were to create pressures to adopt such
standards in developing substantive doctrine, that dynamic
should itself count as a reason for disfavoring licensing systems
and injunctions.
Second, the dissemination of speech may create public
opinion pressures that can exert a healthy influence on the for96. For accounts of the problems encountered by private parties seeking to
contest government assertions regarding national security, see H. MoRLAND,
supra note 84, at 162-63; K. SALTER, THE PENTAGON PAPERS TRIAL 84, 117 (1975);
S. UNGER, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS 171, 194-45 (1972).
97. The classic documentation of this point is contained in Z. CHAPEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1942). See also T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 9-10 (1970).

98. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
99. See, e.g., Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 10-13 18-19.
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mulation and application of first amendment standards. How
warmly one responds to this consideration depends on attitudes regarding judicial independence, the autonomy of legal
reasoning, and the like. In the realm of civil liberties, moreover, it is not always the case that the force of public opinion
aids the cause of freedom. Nevertheless, there will be some
cases, particularly those involving exposes of governmental
abuse, where judges inclined to suppress speech would be constrained by public opinion if the populace could be made aware
of the contents of the speech in dispute. Seldom will such public awareness generate political and social pressures to suppress speech that are not already felt or anticipated by judges
who must decide first amendment disputes.
Third, once a communication is disseminated it becomes to
some extent a fait accompli. The world is a slightly different
place; perceptions regarding what is tolerable are altered. Not
only can the effects of the speech not be undone, views regarding the desirability of those effects will be influenced by the
common human tendency to find virtue in the status quo. This
phenomenon too may influence the formulation and application
of doctrine in the direction of permitting more speech.
Finally, a judge's determination whether speech is constitutionally protected is likely to be influenced by the fact that, in
the case of adjudication before dissemination, a permissive decision can result in the judge being held responsible for any adverse consequences that ensue from the expressive activity. If
a protest march disintegrates into a riot, the judge who ordered
the issuance of the parade permit will be criticized. If the publication of a book the CIA tried unsuccessfully to enjoin should
result in the assassination of a covert agent, the judge who denied the injunction will be held responsible. One could argue
that this is nothing more than the prospective accountability
that most other decision makers must endure. In the realm of
judicial interpretation of the first amendment, however, the
caution inducing constraints that bind bureaucrats and politicians may be viewed as undesirable.
This last observation introduces a theme of general significance. That public opinion pressures, the fait accompli phenomenon, and the absence of prospective accountability may
sometimes expand the ambit of protected speech need not be
considered an argument against adjudication in the abstract.
These considerations could be viewed as distorting influences
that might cause substantive first amendment standards to de-
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viate, in the direction of protecting too much speech, from the
optimal formulation that would be arrived at by a balanced assessment of competing values. In the same vein, one could
even argue that data concerning the initial consequences of a
communication may distort judgment regarding what were the
actual dangers generated by the communication. Dangers that
never materialize into harms are dangers nonetheless, the creation of which can be considered a culpable, or at least prohibitable, act. In short, it is not obvious that the dynamics of
subsequent punishment should be preferred simply because
unforeseen events or common psychological propensities often
make speakers appear less dangerous after the fact.
The case for preferring subsequent punishment regimes on
this account rests on some basic, though not incontrovertible,
notions regarding first amendment adjudication in general.
One such notion is that judges tend to be unduly risk averse in
ruling upon the claims of speakers. Among those scholars
whose professional interests encompass the practical dynamics
of doctrinal development, Chafee, Kalven, and Emerson have
made the most enduring contributions to first amendment theory. Each of these observers was impressed by how patterns of
inertia and conformity, and attitudes of fear, caution, and intol00
erance, affect the development of first amendment doctrine.
The various theories and recommendations for doctrinal reform
put forth by Chafee, Kalven, and Emerson have in common the
view that first amendment doctrines should be designed to
minimize the impact of such constricting social and psychological factors. The debilitating effect of excessive caution is also a
theme that permeates the eloquent opinions of Holmes and
Brandeis, who urged us to view life as an experiment and to
free ourselves from "the bondage of irrational fears."101 If the
need to counteract chronic risk-averse tendencies regarding the
regulation of controversial speech is taken as one of the central
considerations in the formulation of first amendment doctrine,
a preference for the dynamics of subsequent punishment
makes sense. The ideal of a "balanced assessment of competing values" is unlikely to be achieved in the sterile, caution100. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 97, at 23-27, 60-79; T. EMERsON, supra note 97,
at 9-14; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 32;
Kalven, supra note 99, at 17.
101. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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inducing environment of adjudication prior to initial dissemination.
In addition to this desire to correct judicial risk aversion,
the dynamics of subsequent punishment might be preferred
because they shift the mode of decision making into essentially
pragmatic channels. There may be something to be said for
avoiding anything resembling an ideology of repression. Per-'
haps we should prefer that every occasion for the regulation of
speech be a matter of practical necessity, an exceptional occasion, unique and particularistic. So long as first amendment
doctrines are tempered by such practical considerations as the
wisdom of hindsight, public opinion pressures, and the fait accompli phenomenon, the regulation of speech may never develop an expansive logic of its own. The chief virtue of
Holmes's clear and present danger test may lie not so much in
where it draws the line, but rather in its insistence that every
case is to be judged in its unique factual context and viewed as
a "matter of proximity and degree."' 02 It is the cancer of tidy
doctrine, feeding on its internal logic, that is most to be feared
in the ultrahazardous realm of speech regulation. Adjudication
in the abstract, for which reality testing is at a minimum, can
be a breeding ground for tidy doctrine.
Finally, the dynamics of subsequent punishment tend to
mitigate one of the disturbing paradoxes of any system of
speech regulation that conditions liability on consequences:
the fact that the more effective speakers are (or are likely to
be) in influencing their audiences, the more certain they are to
be punished (or prohibited from speaking). This paradox can
never be escaped entirely, but under subsequent punishment
regimes the factors of favorable public reception and the fait
accompli phenomenon operate to the benefit of speakers who
capture the favor of the public. It is also true that speakers
who stir up their crowds more effectively than would have been
predicted will suffer under a regime of subsequent punishment,
but that phenomenon seems so exceptional that it should not
count much in the analysis. On balance, speakers who prove to
be persuasive and attractive are likely to fare better as a result
of the regulatory dynamics of subsequent punishment. That
consequence in itself may constitute a reason to consider those
dynamics a positive good.
In sum, licensing systems and injunctions have in common
the adjudication of disputes regarding controversial communi102. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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cations at a time prior to the initial dissemination of the speech
in question. Such adjudication tends to have an abstract quality because courts are then insulated from some of the pragmatic considerations that influence adjudication under the
subsequent punishment regimes. There are reasons, deriving
from certain fundamental perspectives on the first amendment
that are widely shared among modern theorists, for viewing
those pragmatic influences as salutary. The common feature of
adjudication in the abstract thus provides one reason for linking together licensing systems and injunctions at the center of
a general theory of prior restraint.
VI. OVERUSE
So far we have examined how prior and subsequent systems of regulation compare in terms of their impact on potential speakers and on judges called upon to adjudicate the legal
status of particular communications. Another dimension to
consider is the impact of the various systems on the behavior
of persons who seek to accomplish the suppression or sanctioning of speech. This is a diverse class of actors that includes legislators who work for speech-restrictive legislation, police
officers who arrest speakers or try to deter speech by threats,
licensing officials, prosecutors, and private persons who bring
lawsuits against speakers. I shall refer to this group collectively as regulatory agents. It is possible that injunctive and licensing systems are undesirable simply because they tend in
operation -to be too fully utilized by regulatory agents-too
often invoked to generate prohibitions that are too often enforced. If it is important that the regulation of speech be only
an occasional, exceptional event, any system that tends by virtue of its efficiencies or internal dynamics to be either casually
or pervasively employed may for that reason alone properly be
saddled with an adverse presumption designed to ensure that
the system is used only in isolated, compelling situations.
The argument from overuse for preferring the subsequent
punishment regimes is rather curious. It depends on the proposition that the frequency and effectiveness with which various
regulatory powers are invoked is a proper matter to consider in
determining which powers are constitutionally valid. If a
power is valid when used sparingly, why should it become invalid when used systematically? If we want only a few exceptionally harmful communications to be regulated, should not that
rationing be achieved by defining very narrowly what speech is
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unprotected against any form of regulation rather than by preferring the more inefficient and unsystematic methods of
regulation?
Not necessarily. In one sense, all first amendment issues
involve a tension between the gains to be expected from
speech (transmission of knowledge, cathartic release, and so
forth) and the social risks and costs associated with controversial communications (antisocial actions caused, misimpressions created, irritations engendered). The strength of the
social interests supporting regulation depends to some extent
on variables, such as the intensity preferences of persons who
feel threatened by speech, that are more easily assessed by politically responsible or personally involved regulatory agents
than by judges seeking to apply legal doctrines in a detached
fashion. If the regulation of speech is made a costly, time consuming, even aggravating process, only the most highly motivated regulatory agents will persevere. The dedication of the
regulatory agents who happen to be involved is by no means a
perfect proxy for the severity of the harms caused by a particular communication. Nonetheless, a political culture that tends,
due to the propensities toward risk aversion discussed in the
preceding section, to prefer too much regulation of speech
probably can be relied upon to produce persevering regulatory
agents whenever a speech causes or threatens to cause truly
serious social harms. In this regard, a doctrinal preference for
cumbersome procedures erects a filter which can supplement
the effort to identify by means of substantive standards the occasions when the social interests in regulating speech outweigh
the various interests served by unfettered expression.
To this point, we have been assuming a basically healthy
political culture, albeit one with certain dynamics that encourage overuse of the power to regulate speech. Under the
view of first amendment theory that I hold, however, the pathological dimension must also be considered.10 3 What happens if
social or political forces cause a great upsurge in the propensity
to regulate expression? We should, I think, prefer those systems of regulation that would perform best, in terms of preserving the constitutional commitment to free expression, under

such stress.
From this perspective, the argument from overuse is more
than merely coherent; it is important, even basic. No legal doctrine is likely to withstand a sea change in the attitudes of soci103. See Blasi, supra note 65.
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ety regarding repression. Where doctrine can make a
difference is in containing flash floods, those passing but potentially destructive moments in the history of nations when the
veneer of rationality cracks and political discourse comes to be
dominated by hysterical, xenophobic impulses and the wild imagery of demagogues. On such occasions, delays and other inefficiencies built into the procedures for regulating speech can
give the forces of moderation valuable time to regain control.
An argument from overuse is thus not incongruous if one
accepts either the pessimistic view of normal regulatory dynamics espoused by the leading first amendment theorists of
modern times0 4 or my own belief that pathological scenarios
should figure prominently in the formulation of first amendment doctrine. It remains to be shown, however, that injunctions and licensing systems share, in comparison with the
subsequent punishment regimes, a tendency to be overused.
Roughly speaking, regulatory systems are used in two
ways: to generate specific prohibitions, and to enforce those
prohibitions by means of sanctions. Thus, a licensing system
generates specific prohibitions in the form of denials of permit
applications, and an injunctive system generates specific injunctions. It is not quite so clear how a criminal statute should
be classified; is it a system in its own right that generates specific prosecutorial warnings and charges, or is it a "specific"
prohibition that is generated by the larger "system" of criminal
law? If it is the latter, criminal statutes, although phrased in
general terms, belong on the same plane for purposes of comparison as particularized injunctions and permit denials. A
similar problem of classification pertains to civil liability rules.
In deciding which stages of the various regimes to compare, a dominant consideration should be when in each process
the most significant discretionary judgments are made, for
those are the decisions that determine how heavily a regulatory
system is used. Licensing systems typically are established by
statute, but the authorizing statutes usually give licensing officials wide scope to decide which communications to ban. The
pivotal normative judgments in such systems occur when individual permit requests are ruled upon. This is true even
though first amendment doctrines of vagueness, overbreadth,
and undue delegation prohibit legislatures from setting up licensing regimes that are wholly devoid of standards.10 5 Partly
104. See authorities cited in note 100 supra.
105. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969);
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because lack of notice to speakers is not a problem in this context, and partly because licensing systems are regarded as
most efficacious when the regulatory decision requires nonmechanical judgments by experienced, specialized decision
makers, courts have not insisted that the substantive standards
in licensing schemes be highly determinative of outcomes in individual cases. The import of Supreme Court doctrine in this
regard has been to prevent licensing officials from operating in
a standardless vacuum so as to check the possibility of gross
abuses of discretion. That problem aside, administrative judgments in permit application cases remain highly discretionary
in nature. Those judgments constitute the stage that most determines how heavily a licensing system will be used.
For injunctive systems as well, the pivotal judgments that
establish the level of use occur when individual situations are
ruled upon rather than when general standards are adopted.
Although certain statutes vest special injunctive authority in
courts and specify the standards to be applied in exercising
that authority,106 most injunctions prohibiting speech derive
from broad judicial equity powers that rest on inherent court
authority or content-neutral jurisdictional statutes. 0 7 The principal normative judgment is made at the stage when the specific injunction is issued.
In contrast, criminal statutes and civil liability rules almost
always embody specific normative judgments regarding what
kinds of communications should be permitted. Difficult questions of application can arise, of course, but the normative judgment that is made by a legislature or common-law court at the
stage when the general standard is formulated typically represents the most significant choice in the system regarding how
the trade-off between communicative benefits and social harms
is to be resolved. In this regard, injunctions and permit denials
seem more comparable to criminal statutes and civil liability
Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. City of N.Y., 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
106. The statute upheld in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957), is an example.
107. So far as the reports reveal, neither the injunction in Organization For
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), nor the pretrial order in Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), were issued pursuant to statutory authority. The government's injunction action in New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), was based on a claim of inherent executive

authority.
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rules than to particular criminal convictions and civil damage
awards.
Apart from basic normative judgments concerning standards of legality, the most significant discretionary decisions in
the different systems relate to levels of enforcement: whether
to prosecute an apparent violation of the criminal law; whether
to bring suit under a liability rule; whether to prosecute for
contempt of court or for violation of a permit requirement. Discretionary judgments of this sort, as well as those made at later
stages such as sentencing, concern the question how fully to
enforce the basic value judgment embodied in the general
criminal or civil standard, or the particular injunction or permit
denial. Again, individual injunctions and permit denials function on a plane with criminal statutes and civil liability rules.
In assessing patterns of use, therefore, I compare the
processes by which statutes are passed and common law doctrines are formulated under the subsequent punishment regimes with the processes by which particular injunctions are
issued and particular permit applications are ruled upon. I
compare criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits with contempt proceedings and prosecutions for speaking without a required permit.
Injunctions are issued and permit applications are denied
"by a stroke of the pen." In both cases, the process is expeditious. Certain procedures and evidentiary burdens limit how
readily and pervasively those systems can be employed by regulatory agents, but checks of that sort do not fundamentally alter the essentially expeditious character of the prior regulatory
regimes.
Under traditional principles of equity, regulatory agents
who seek to enjoin speech normally must establish that "irreparable harm" is likely to ensue if the speech is not enjoined. 08
They must convince the court that "legal" remedies (subsequent punishments, in the main) will not adequately protect
the social interests threatened by the speech.109 But those are
burdens of persuasion more than preparation; they are not
likely to deter or seriously delay regulatory agents who desire
to invoke legal authority to suppress speech. Were it not for
the additional adverse presumption imposed by the doctrine of
prior restraint, the swiftness and relatively streamlined nature
of the procedures by which injunctions are issued could be ex108.
109.

See generally 0. Fiss, INwUNCnONS 9-51 (1972).
See D. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 57-62, 108.
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pected to attract regulatory agents in droves. Overuse of the
power to regulate speech is likely under such conditions, particularly in light of the political gains some regulatory agents
may achieve when the public's cry for suppression can be satisfied while emotions are still running high.
No special burden of persuasion, and in most cases not
even a formal hearing, operates to check the suppressive stroke
of the pen by a licensing official. Under Freedmanv. Maryland,
it is true, a permit denial can only be effectuated if the administrative authorities go to court and secure a judicial order.1"o
The burden of persuasion in the judicial proceeding rests with
the licensing officials who seek to suppress the speech. However, this burden is far from overwhelming. Licensing officials
can be expected to develop expertise in bringing such cases to
court.
Not only are there no major burdens to force licensing officials to make priority judgments, there may be bureaucratic dynamics that encourage casual, routine invocation of the power
to regulate expression. Licensing officials typically are selected
because of their knowledge and concern about the social interests the regulatory system is designed to protect-crowd control, for example, or conventional mores regarding sexual
depiction. These officials can be expected to begin their chores
with a predisposition to regulate expression. 1 ' The experience
of ruling upon numerous permit applications, moreover, is
hardly likely to heighten what little appreciation such persons
may have for the value of free expression. When the phenomenon of prospective accountability is added to the calculus, it
seems inevitable that regulatory impulses of low or intermediate intensity would be pursued by most licensing officials absent some sort of doctrinal check deriving from a theory of
prior restraint.
Under the subsequent punishment regimes, in contrast, the
process by which regulatory impulses are implemented is far
more complicated, drawn out, and interlaced with disincentives. The passage of a criminal statute requires a majority
vote in two separate representative bodies (except in Nebraska). The traditional practice of committee deliberation
slows down the process and often provides an opportunity for
political minorities (including proponents of strong speech
rights) to kill or modify proposed legislation. The gubernatorial
110.
111.

See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
See authorities cited in note 50 supra.
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veto constitutes an additional obstacle. The power to legislate
against speech can certainly be abused, but usually only when
the preferences of the political community run intensely in the
direction of repression. Even then, the cumbersome nature of
the legislative process makes it difficult for the regulatory
forces to keep up with innovative, adaptive speakers such as
pornographers. Injunctions and permit requirements, for
which the basic substantive norms are formulated case by case,
seem by comparison far more susceptible to both casual and
comprehensive use.
A somewhat different set of constraints limits the regulatory uses to which common law liability rules can be put. As
with an injunction, all it takes is one court decision to establish
a common law doctrine that severely restricts the right to
speak. In theory, a comprehensive regime of repression could
be implemented by means of a few judicial opinions fashioning
tort doctrines that authorize compensation for persons who are
offended, embarrassed, or frightened by controversial communications. Powerful common law traditions make this scenario
highly unlikely, however, even in periods of hysteria. The process of common law development is by tradition gradual.
Sweeping changes occur, to be sure, but usually only after extensive foreshadowing and testing in judicial dictum and academic commentary. Moreover, common law doctrines are
supposed to be principled; specific results in cases are evaluated in large part according to their analogical consequences.
Fleeting regulatory impulses, even those of an intense nature,
are likely to be filtered out by these aspects of the common law
tradition, as well as by the lengthy docket delays that plague
civil litigation in many jurisdictions.
So far as the formulation of prohibitory norms is concerned, it would seem that the procedures and traditions of the
subsequent punishment regimes provide fairly effective safeguards against too casual or pervasive a use of the power to
regulate speech. By comparison, injunctive and licensing systems are particularly susceptible to being invoked in response
to momentary public passions or political preferences that are
not widely shared or deeply felt.
The various regulatory systems also exhibit differences in
their enforcement procedures that can be expected to affect
levels and patterns of use. Several forces combine to generate
a logic of full enforcement of injunctions. Because of the personalized nature of the prohibition, the disobedience of an in-
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junction takes on the character of defiance of the legal system
itself. Symbolic considerations may dictate prosecution when
material considerations alone would not. Even if officials might
not regard a particular violation as serious, they may have difficulty pretending not to notice it because the personalized character of the proceedings at which injunctions are issued often
places enjoinees in the public eye. In addition, the decision
whether to charge speakers with contempt is often made by the
judge who issued the injunction in the first place.112 When performing a prosecutorial function, a judge can be considered a
regulatory agent. Many judges who have issued injunctions
may feel a personal stake in the enforcement of their orders,
and may also feel emboldened in making prosecutorial decisions by the knowledge that they will preside over the contempt proceedings. The fact that a conviction for contempt can
be had within a short time after a violation takes place also
should tend to encourage prosecutions. Finally, the existence
of the collateral bar rule means that regulatory agents need not
worry that the speaker's first amendment defenses will abort or
complicate a contempt prosecution. It is not surprising that
there is no real tradition of prosecutorial discretion with regard
to violations of injunctions.
Licensing systems are enforced by means of regular criminal prosecutions. Many of the forces that generate a logic of
full enforcement of injunctions thus do not operate in the context of licensing: the promulgator of the legal norm does not
make the enforcement decision, the lead time between violation and conviction is no shorter than for other types of criminal cases, and a tradition of prosecutorial discretion operates.
Two factors suggest, however, that permit requirements are
likely to be enforced more frequently than most other laws regulating speech.
First, the equivalent of a partial collateral bar rule governs
prosecutions for speaking without a required permit. Defendants are permitted to contend that the licensing law is unconstitutional on its face, but not that the permit denial in their
3
particular case was a violation of the first amendment."1 So
long as the licensing system as a whole is not invalid, the prosecution of persons who speak in the face of a permit denial or
who ignore the permit process entirely is generally a pro forma
matter. All the prosecutor must establish is that the activity
112. See 0. Fxss, supra note 13, at 30-31.
113. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
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engaged in by the defendants falls within the category of acts
for which a permit is required. The prosecution of permit violations ordinarily requires little investigation or preparation by
the district attorney's office. A high conviction rate can be anticipated. The prospect of success can function as a spur to
prosecution.
Second, symbolic considerations should engender a propensity to prosecute permit violations. When a permit is actually sought and denied, a decision by the rejected applicant to
proceed anyway with the proposed speech takes on the character of direct defiance, at least as much as does the violation of
an injunction. Speakers who never even apply for a permit
may not be defiant in quite so vivid a way, but if they are not
prosecuted the future credibility of the permit requirement
may suffer. Although the failure to prosecute any crime can affect its credibility as a deterrent, the fact that the obligation to
apply for a permit is a formal, usually unambiguous and simple, requirement makes the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
regarding permit violations a particularly stark example of condoning inexcusable lawlessness. For most other speech crimes,
in contrast, the decision not to prosecute can be attributed to
the possibility of valid defenses or extenuating circumstances.
Furthermore, speakers who have subjected themselves to the
delays and inconveniences of the permit process may feel mistreated if other speakers are allowed to escape those burdens.
The several factors that encourage full enforcement of injunctive prohibitions and permit requirements would seem not
to be counterbalanced by any comparable factors that are peculiar to the subsequent punishment regimes. I can think of only
two considerations that might enhance the propensity to invoke subsequent sanctions. The first is the fact that violations
of civil liability rules are "prosecuted" by private parties seeking personal gain rather than experienced officials sworn to uphold the common good. Such private enforcers do not have to
make priority judgments regarding which unlawful activities
pose the most serious threats to the social order. Petty, vindictive enforcement efforts can be expected. The very fact that
private "prosecutions" are uncoordinated, however, reduces
their capacity to serve as efficient instruments of systematic repression. In addition, docket delays, ignorance concerning legal
rights, inexperience, and litigation expenses (despite the contingent fee system) are all factors that should reduce the incidence of civil liability actions against speakers. On balance, the
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phenomenon of private enforcement would seem to pose no
special threat of overuse of the power to regulate expression.
Second, a regulatory agent who would like to enforce a prohibition on speaking may be deterred from bringing suit by the
prospect of a jury trial, which can be time consuming and also
a source of popular check on excessive enforcement of speechrestrictive legal norms. Speakers are guaranteed a jury trial by
the Federal Constitution in contempt proceedings, criminal
prosecutions to enforce permit requirements, and criminal
prosecutions generally, but not in civil actions." 4 The absence
of the jury check could, in theory, contribute to the overuse of
civil sanctions. However, all state constitutions guarantee civil
defendants a jury trial.115 If that safeguard were removed,
moreover, it is possible that the first amendment would be read
to require some such right in the case of civil actions against
speakers, in libel and privacy litigation for example. Differences in theoretical jury trial rights in the various regimes,
therefore, is no basis for viewing liability rules as problematic
on the score of overenforcement.
To summarize, certain methods of speech regulation lend
themselves more than others to frequent and pervasive use. It
is not incongruous as a matter of first amendment theory to institutionalize a preference for sparing, selective use of the
power to regulate expression. Both in the formulation and the
enforcement of prohibitory norms, licensing and injunctive systems are likely to be used more heavily than the subsequent
punishment systems. Such a tendency toward overuse unites
licensing systems and injunctions in one respect that can figure
prominently in a general theory of prior restraint.
VII.

IMPACT ON AUDIENCE RECEPTION

In addition to its impact on speakers, judges, and regulatory agents, a system should be evaluated also in terms of how
its distinctive features affect the way audiences receive the
communications that take place notwithstanding the regulatory
constraints imposed by the system. Although speech can serve
a function even when no one is influenced by what is said, all
major first amendment theories place a high value on the social
process by which persons are persuaded by communications to
change their moral and empirical beliefs. It should be a matter
of doctrinal concern if certain laws or methods of regulation
114. 47 AM. JuR. Jury § 9 (2d ed. 1969).
115. Id. § 10.
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cause audiences to shrink, or individual listeners to respond
less intently (pro or con) to the speaker's message.
Licensing systems and injunctions governed by the collateral bar rule share the characteristic of providing an authoritative adjudication regarding the legality of a disputed
communication before the moment of its initial dissemination.
This phenomenon can have two effects that might be detrimental to audience reception of some communications that are determined to be constitutionally protected. First, the process of
adjudication can delay dissemination of the speaker's message
to a time when audience interest has waned or opportunities to
act upon the speaker's advice have passed. We discussed the
factor of delay in connection with self-censorship. 1 6 Here the
concern is with delays that do not cause persons to abandon
their plans to speak but nonetheless adversely affect how audiences receive the speeches that eventually are made. Second,
even when delay is not a factor, audiences may react less intently, perhaps less spontaneously, when they know that the
speech has already passed through a regulatory filter.
No one would deny that there are times when the impact of
speech will be diminished if self-help is disallowed and both
speakers and audiences are made to await the outcome of adjudication. The important questions for the present analysis are
three: (1) What proportion of communications are affected by
the limited delays imposed by the expeditious adjudication
that characterizes modern injunctive and licensing systems?
(2) When some adverse impact on audience reception can be
traced to delay, how serious should that cost be regarded in
light of the fact that the message ultimately gets into circulation? (3) Does the fact that delay can sometimes stimulate the
interest of a potential audience offset the undoubted costs of
delay on other occasions?
For some communications such as election-eve appeals to
voters or nationally coordinated protest demonstrations, the
importance of precise timing is obvious. On a broader front,
newspapers chafe under delays of short duration not simply for
fear of being scooped by the competition (a vanishing phenomenon in most localities), but also out of a desire that information about ongoing stories be disseminated when it can still
shape the course of events. Even when the need for immediate
communication is not obvious, moreover, the tactical preferences of speakers warrant consideration. We live, for better or
116. See section IV(B) supra at 30-32.
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worse, in an electronic age characterized by such phenomena
as sensory overload and diminishing attention spans. Professionals in the business of public opinion manipulation give
great attention to matters of timing." 7 The fact that many
speakers regard the nuances of timing as important is itself
good evidence that audiences are affected, if only in ways that
often cannot be documented, by even short delays. It would
seem to be the exception, rather than the rule, when the adjudicative delays of a licensing or injunctive system have no impact on how the audience responds to the communication that
eventually is disseminated.
We must ask, however, how costly in terms of first amendment values is the impact of delay in most situations. There is
a tendency to assume uncritically that timing is of the essence
for most communications. Yesterday's news is history; yesterday's protest is passe. Speakers may place such extraordinary
emphasis on timing, but should first amendment theory?
As one who believes that a central function of free expression is to check the abuse of governmental power, my chief
concern is that speech relating to the behavior of public officials be disseminated soon enough to permit a checking process to operate." 8 Sometimes a short delay in dissemination
can permit government officials to present the public with afait
accompli. Military operations come to mind. Much of the time,
however, the modest delays inherent in licensing and injunctive procedures will be inconsequential in terms of the long-run
impact of a communication. Trial reporting is an example. I
view with skepticism claims by news organizations that a few
days delay in publishing reports about judicial proceedings can
greatly impair the news value of what is published. No doubt a
large segment of the public has little interest in stories that are
not of the utmost topicality, but only at some stages of the
checking process-as when a campaign against misbehavior becomes an ongoing story in its own right-is it essential to capture the attention of such persons. Moreover, important
exposes regarding past events usually create their own
topicality.
This is not to suggest that the costs of delay should be accorded little weight in comparing the different regulatory regimes. The checking value is not the only point of reference for
117. See, e.g., L. BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 177-79 (1967); D. NnMo,
THE POrnCAL PERSUADERS 29-30, 55-56 (1970).
118. See generally Blasi, supra note 65.
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interpreting the first amendment, and even that value is undercut occasionally by the kinds of delays that characterize licensing systems and injunctions. My only point is that the costs of
delay are highly variable, and should not be uncritically
assumed.
A further complication in the analysis derives from the fact
that on occasion a well publicized delay can actually have a
positive effect on the impact of a communication by whetting
the appetite or arousing the curiosity of an audience. More persons probably read the Pentagon Papers as a result of the government's effort to enjoin them than would have done so had
there been no such attempt and no resulting delay of publication. Millions of people learned about the existence and views
of the American Nazi Party as a result of the protracted Skokie
litigation. 1 9 It is no answer to say that if such delays were really advantageous to speakers, government officials would not
institute the proceedings that create that effect. When a licensing or injunctive system is invoked against a speaker, the goal
is to suppress the speech; if that goal is achieved, the delay will
not intensify any audience reaction, for there will be none.
Likewise, that aspiring speakers do not want to be enjoined or
enmeshed in permit litigation does not mean that they do not
enjoy the best of all worlds, in terms of audience response, on
those occasions when they prevail in the litigation. The main
reason speakers dislike delay-creating litigation is that they
may lose. In assessing the impact delay has on audience reception of communications that ultimately are permitted by the legal system, the positive effects of delay would seem to be a
major offsetting factor.
In general, it is doubtful that the net effect of delays of the
duration common in licensing and injunctive systems is seriously detrimental to audience reaction in most instances. On
some important occasions, however, even a short delay is likely
to be devastating to the impact of a communication. In settling
the legal status of whole methods of regulation, it is necessary
to generalize about a highly diverse set of situations. Given
that need, the narrow but occasionally severe impact of the delay factor should constitute a reason of intermediate impor119. See generally National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977); Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (ND. Ill.), affid, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.
1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 IMl. 2d 605, 373 N.E. 2d 21
(1978).
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tance for disfavoring the regimes that most often cause the
dissemination of speech to be delayed.
The second major way in which the phenomenon of prior
adjudication can affect audience reception is by influencing
public expectations regarding a communication before the moment of its initial dissemination. Several distorting effects can
be hypothesized.
First, audiences may wonder whether the communication
that is transmitted represents the true message the speaker desired to convey. Did the speaker change a few passages in order to placate the censor or expedite the process of prior
approval? Often there is no way to know, but doubts can infect
the experience of reception. Consider the impact when a film
begins with the message "edited for television." Throughout
the film, the thought recurs, "What am I missing?" John
Milton, in his polemic against censorship, Areopagitica, captures the essence of this objection to prior governmental evaluation of communications:
And how can a man teach with authority, which is the life of teaching,
how can he be a doctor in his book, as he ought to be, or else had better be silent, whenas all he teaches, all he delivers, is but under the tuition, under the correction, of his patriarchal licenser, to blot or alter
what precisely accords not with the hidebound humor which he calls
his judgment? When every acute reader, upon the first sight of a pedantic license, will be ready with these like words to ding the book a
quoit's distance from him: "I hate a pupil teacher, I endure not an instructor that comes to me under the wardship of an overseeing fist, I
know nothing of the licenser, but that I have his own hand here for his
-120
arrogance; who shall warrant me his judgment ....

Trust is essential to the relationship between speakers and
their audiences, and the intervention of government prior to
the moment of initial contact can disturb that trust.
Second, the granting of a license or the lifting of an injunction constitutes an official seal of approval, the modern day
equivalent of an imprimatur. In a curious way, speeches that
have such a characterization may lose some of their impact for
that reason alone. The element of excitement that is present
when a speaker presses a protest to the edge of legality, accepting the risk of criminal or civil sanctions, is absent. The
whole event is safe. Sometimes dissident speakers will ask
their audiences to risk the wrath of the authorities in order to
accomplish certain political or social objectives. Those appeals
120. Milton, Areopagiticen A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing
to the Parliamentof England, in THE PORTABLE MImTON 151, 180 (D. Bush ed.

1949).
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can have greater impact when the speakers, by virtue of the act
of speaking itself, can be seen to practice what they preach.
The uncertainty regarding legality that characterizes the subsequent punishment regimes may cause undesirable self-censorship,121 but in terms of its impact on audience response to a
communication, uncertainty may actually be a positive force.
Third, perceptions regarding a well publicized prior adjudication may displace in the public mind any reaction to the contents of the communication itself. Harrison Salisbury believes
that although the litigation over the Pentagon Papers aroused
intense public interest, the net effect of the New York Times'
dramatic legal victory was to cause people to talk and think
about the first amendment rather than the duplicity of the warplanners in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.12 2 A
different adverse impact on audience reaction can occur when
the drama of litigation engenders in the public mind exaggerated expectations regarding what the disputed communication
must contain. When the genuine article finally sees the light of
day, the communication may have less impact due to the defeat
of those expectations than it would have had if the audience
had been permitted to respond to it afresh.
The impact of prior adjudication is not always detrimental
to speakers, however. Prior adjudication sometimes can make
speakers into celebrities whose credibility with the public is
enhanced by their newly acquired status. Furthermore, speech
critical of government may seem more credible and more significant if, at the moment of initial dissemination, the government is on record as having tried to suppress it. In addition,
audience sympathy for speakers on the first amendment issue
can spill over to the substance of the message that ultimately is
conveyed. It might be argued that these possibilities cut
against the disfavoring of licensing systems and injunctions.
The ideal from the standpoint of first amendment theory, however, should not be favorable reception of speeches but rather
undistorted reception. That regimes of prior restraint tend on
occasion to cause certain communications to have an unwarranted impact may itself constitute an argument for preferring
alternative methods of regulation.
In short, prior adjudication erects a filter between speaker
and audience. Even for the messages that pass through the
filter, the communicative process is detrimentally affected by
121.

See section IV(F) supra at 47-48.

122.

H. SALISBURY, WroTOU

FEAR OR FAVOR

334-36 (1980).
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the existence of such a barrier. The impact is difficult to document or predict, but under any theory that values speech
largely for its capacity to influence listeners, this filtering phenomenon should be regarded as undesirable.
Under the subsequent punishment regimes, communications are neither delayed nor filtered. The only way in which
audience reception might be adversely affected by subsequent
methods of regulation is if listeners are themselves made to
risk punishment for merely attending communicative events.
Such a risk could cause audiences to dwindle. There have been
occasions when local prosecutors have arrested viewers of
pornographic films, but that practice has met with a chilly judicial reception. 123 Occasionally, observers of protest demonstrations may run the risk of being swept into the prosecutorial net
should events get out of hand. But these are aberrational situations. In no systematic way does the possibility of civil or criminal sanctions interfere with the way an audience responds to,a
speaker's message.
Thus, because they share the feature of adjudication prior
to initial dissemination, licensing systems and injunctions
seem more likely than the subsequent punishment regimes to
have an adverse impact on how audiences perceive communications that are protected under the first amendment. The case
for linking licensing systems and injunctions at the center of a
theory of prior restraint is made stronger by consideration of
this dimension of audience reception.
VIII. UNACCEPTABLE PREMISES
To this point, we have evaluated the various methods of
speech regulation exclusively in terms of their impact on the
behavior of speakers, adjudicators, regulatory agents, and audiences. Behavioral impact is not, however, the only dimension
that needs to be considered in determining whether a regulatory method should be disfavored under the first amendment.
One function of a constitution is to preserve certain institutional structures and public attitudes relating to the concept of
political authority. In particular, the Bill of Rights should be interpreted not only with an eye to the actors who have a stake in
the litigation at hand, but also with regard for the entire political community's stake in preserving a certain desired alloca123. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 539 & n.87. See also Bee See Books,
Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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tion of power between two vital abstract entities: the state and
the individual citizen.
Regulatory procedures may distort that allocation if they
are based on premises that are inconsistent with the philosophy of limited government that lies at the heart of the American constitutional tradition. To legitimate a procedure that
embodies such objectionable premises is to weaken the coherence of the constitutional scheme, even when no undesirable
behavioral effects can be ascribed to the operation of the procedure. The term "premises" in this regard embraces more than
the underlying rationale for a method of regulation. A method
with an unassailable rationale may in operation exhibit features that symbolically exalt the role of the state or demean the
role of the individual. Symbolic statements of that kind can, if
legitimated in constitutional adjudication, serve to erode the
fragile set of attitudes and structures upon which the constitutional balance depends. Any analysis based on such abstract
notions as underlying rationales and symbolic statements is
bound to be elusive. Nevertheless, an inquiry that is restricted
to the behavioral dimension ignores a vital part of the constitutional calculus. Premises are no less important because they
are difficult to identify and assess.
Modern analysis of the problem of prior restraint tends not
to pay much attention to the question of premises. That tendency was not exhibited by the greatest writer who ever addressed the subject of prior restraint. John Milton's
Areopagitica,written in the form of a petition to the Long Parliament in 1644, remains the classic exposition on the evils of
censorship. 24 Many of the arguments developed by Milton
have been appropriated in the behavioral sections of the present analysis. Milton complained, for example, that ideas cannot
fairly be judged before they are disseminated. 2 5 He objected
to the cautiousness and insensitivity to learning likely to be
displayed by the types of persons who would agree to assume
the tedious chores of the censor.126 He worried greatly about
the stifling self-censorship effect of requiring an author to seek
out the censor each time a new idea for a revision comes to
mind.' 27 He feared that audiences are likely to view a writing
with skepticism when they cannot be sure that the version they
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Milton, supra note 120.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 179.
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are permitted to read represents the true beliefs of the
writer.128 What strikes the modern reader most, however, upon
returning to the Areopagitica, is the extent to which Milton's
argument rests on his objection to the premises that underly
the licensing of speech.
A theme that permeates the essay is the indignity of licensing due to the paternalism inherent in the procedure. In this
view, comprehensive censorship is at odds with the conception
of the proper relationship between citizen and state that underlays the Puritan revolution and is today a central premise of
democratic theory. The key phenomenon appears to be trust.
Licensing implies too much distrust of both writers and readers. A censorship system places the state in the role of a suspicious, omnipresent tutor. No system of political authority
premised on the consent of the governed can admit the state to
that role, whatever the behavioral consequences. The depth of
Milton's conviction on this point is evident in several stirring
passages:
[S]o far to distrust the judgment and the honesty of one who hath but
a common repute in learning, and never yet offended, as not to count
him fit to print his mind without a tutor and examiner, lest he should
drop a schism or something of corruption, is the greatest displeasure
and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.
What advantage is it to be a man over it is to be a boy at school, if
we have only scaped the ferula [paddle for spanking schoolboys] to
come under the fescue [instructional pointer] of an Imprimatur; if serious and elaborate writings, as if they were no more than the theme of a
grammar-lad under his pedagogue, must not be uttered without the
cursory eyes of a temporizing and extemporizing licenser?
....
Nor is it to the common people less than a reproach; for if we
be so jealous over them as that we dare not trust them with an English
pamphlet, what do we but censure them for a giddy, vicious, and ungrounded people, in such a sick and weak estate of faith and discretion
as to be12 9able to take nothing down but through the pipe of a
licenser?

In the licensing of speech Milton saw not only an unbecoming distrust of writers and audiences but also a demeaning of
the very activity of self expression. To Milton, the process of
writing out and publishing one's sentiments was an intensely
personal and exalted endeavor. For this reason, he thought it
far more objectionable for the state to inject itself into the
midst of the process than to impose sanctions for the consequences engendered by the end product. One passage of the
128.
129.

Id. at 180.
Id. at 178, 182.
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Areopagitica conveys better than any other how Milton's disdain for prior restraint derived from his belief in the special importance of written self expression:
When a man writes to the world, he summons up all his reason and deliberation to assist him; he searches, meditates, is industrious, and
likely consults and confers with his judicious friends; after all which
done, he takes himself to be informed in what he writes, as well as any

that writ before him. If in this, the most consummate act of his fidelity
and ripeness, no years, no industry, no former proof of his abilities can
bring him to that state of maturity as not to be still mistrusted and suspected (unless he carry all his considerate diligence, all his midnight
watchings and expense of Palladian oil, to the hasty view of an unleisured licenser, perhaps much his younger, perhaps far his inferior in
judgment, perhaps one who never knew the labor of book-writing), and
if he be not repulsed or slighted, must appear in print like a puny with
his guardian, and his censor's hand on the back of his title to be his
bail and surety that he is no idiot or seducer; it cannot be but a dishonor and derogation to the author, to the book, to the privilege and
dignity of learning. 130

Milton was a creature of his times.131 The speech he was
concerned about, almost exclusively, was Protestant sectarian
disputation. He did not believe in free speech for Roman
Catholics or atheists.132 The question for one who would draw
upon Milton in thinking about the issues of today is whether
the concerns relating to premises that he expressed in the Areopagitica retain significance in an age in which licensing systems are not comprehensive in scope, judgments to censor are
not informed by the repressive traditions of Stuart England,
the speech in dispute is not always in written form, and the
ideas and information at issue do not, for the most part, relate
to sectarian disputes over the fundamental tenets of religious
faith.
The premise of distrust that so disturbed Milton would
seem to underly modern licensing and injunction systems. The
decision to adjudicate the legal status of speech in advance of
its initial dissemination is almost always spurred by the belief
that the public must be denied access entirely to the speech in
question. So concerned is the legal system with how audiences
might respond to the speech that the considerable advantages
of retrospective adjudication are willingly sacrificed. The point
of prior regulation is to suppress, not to sanction. Suppression
represents a particularly active and absolute form of intervention by the state that would seem to reflect the view that nor130.
131.
MILTON
132.

Id. at 178-79.
The political context in which Milton wrote is discussed in C. HL,
AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 149-60 (1977).
Milton, supra note 120, at 201.
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mal, more limited corrective forces, including both the
disincentives created by subsequent sanctioning systems and
the good sense of the citizenry, cannot be relied upon to control
sufficiently the harmful effects of certain communications. To
find the normal corrective forces so inadequate to the task, one
must distrust deeply the motives of speakers, the wisdom of
audiences, or both.
It might be contended that there is good reason to distrust
speakers and audiences, at least in certain contexts. The eighteenth century ideal of rational political man, if indeed it ever
existed, has not survived the discoveries of modern psychology
and the convulsions of twentieth century politics. Brandeis's
dictum that "the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones" 133 rings hollow to an age that has seen demagogues destined to perpetrate unspeakable horrors use the facilities of
mass communication to acquire and retain political power. The
modern appreciation of human frailty may well support a
premise of distrust regarding the capacity of audiences to handle certain ideas (incest, genocide, racial superiority, for example) and certain information (nuclear technology, intimate
personal details). If distrust is not irrational, how can it be
unconstitutional?
The answer is that in the kind of analysis we are presently
engaged in, distrust is a comparative notion. The allocation of
authority between the state and the individual is a function not
simply of how much trust should be placed in the capacity of
private individuals to process communications thoughtfully and
responsibly. Distrust of the state, particularly in its censorial
capacity, is a fundamental value that informs the first amendment. The decision to adjudicate the legal status of a communication before its initial dissemination embodies a premise of
comparative distrust: better trust the regulatory process not to
suppress salutary communications than trust the populace to
reject or ignore unsalutary ones. To trust the censor more than
the audience is to alter the relationship between state and citizen that is central to the philosophy of limited government.
If the objectionable feature of the distrust implicit in licensing and injunctive systems is simply this phenomenon of
comparative distrust, one might question whether the premise
of distrust is a basis for distinguishing prior from subsequent
regulations of speech. Whenever subsequent sanctions are ad133. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
curring).

(Brandeis, J., con-
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ministered in part out of a desire to deter future communications, implicit in the regulatory rationale is the belief that the
public should not hear or read certain messages. Only first
amendment absolutists completely eschew the premise of comparative distrust. All others believe that on occasion the regulatory process is more to be trusted than the good judgment of
audiences, else why not let the speech proceed unhindered by
mechanisms of deterrence?
That a premise of comparative distrust of speakers and
audiences sometimes operates in the subsequent punishment
regimes does not mean, however, that there are no distinctions
to be drawn in this respect between prior and subsequent
methods of regulation. Once again, the timing of adjudication
in relation to the moment of initial dissemination figures prominently in the analysis. There are safety valves in the subsequent punishment systems that reflect both a distrust of the
regulatory process and a respect for audiences. Many violations are not prosecuted. Adjudication draws on the benefits of
hindsight in evaluating the character of particular communications. Audience reception may also be taken into account. Adjudicative judgments typically are rendered some months or
even years after the moment of initial dissemination, which
means the passage of time can allow long-range perspectives to
override momentary suppressive passions. Audiences are not
trusted completely; some communications are punished in order to decrease the likelihood that future audiences will be exposed to similar messages. But neither is the regulatory
process fully trusted; a recognition of the potential for official
error and shortsightedness permeates the design of the subsequent punishment procedures.
In contrast, licensing systems and injunctions do not exhibit such concern for the possibility of official error nor such
respect for the judgment of audiences. The decision to settle
the legal status of a communication before it is ever disseminated to the public is a bold, confident regulatory gesture. No
need is felt to observe the actual consequences of the communication. Audience reception is deemed unimportant.
It may be objected that these features of the prior regulatory regimes do not result from a premise of comparative distrust of speakers and audiences but rather from the undeniable
fact that certain types of communications can cause truly significant and irreparable harms no matter how responsibly most
members of the audience behave. It takes only one terrorist to
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misuse secret nuclear information, and one bluenose to cause a
person to suffer because of his unorthodox personal life. Given
that regrettable reality, on occasion the only sensible regulatory approach may be to suppress rather than sanction. So
long as adjudication prior to initial dissemination is confined to
situations in which the feared harm from a communication is
especially difficult to accept or repair, the choice for prior regulation implies nothing about the trustworthiness as a general
matter of either the regulatory process or the process of audience reception.
This point seems valid, but in fact it supports the conclusion that licensing systems and injunctions should be subject
to an adverse presumption designed to restrict their use to exceptional situations. So long as prior regulation is reserved for
instances of especially serious and irreparable harm, no premise of comparative distrust of speakers and audiences is implicit in the choice of a regulatory method. A premise of
comparative distrust would be implicit, however, if the licensing and enjoining of speech were to be permitted whenever the
case for some form of regulation was convincing.
The preceeding analysis rests on the assumption that when
the legal status of a communication is adjudicated prior to the
moment of initial dissemination, a judgment of illegality decreases the likelihood that the public will ever receive the communication. Only if advance judgments of illegality affect what
messages audiences actually receive does it make sense to institute a system of prior adjudication in response to the perception that audiences cannot be trusted with certain controversial
communications. Is it clear, however, that the phenomenon of
advance adjudication in licensing and injunction cases has
much effect on dissemination patterns relating to the communications that are judged to be illegal?
The universe of speakers who might wish to disseminate
prohibited communications can be divided into three classes:
(1) those who will disseminate their communication even when
they know they will be punished in consequence; (2) those who
will disseminate a communication they know to be prohibited
only if they believe they somehow will escape punishment for
that illegal act; and (3) those who are not willing to violate a
legal prohibition and hence will abandon their effort to disseminate upon learning that their communication is prohibited. It
would seem that speakers in the third category would be less
likely to disseminate their messages under a regime of prior re-
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straint than one of subsequent punishment because adjudication prior to initial dissemination removes all doubt about the
legal status of the proposed communication, whereas the uncertainty inherent in systems of subsequent punishment enables such speakers to disseminate communications that may
ultimately be ruled illegal. Speakers in the second category
also would seem to be less likely to disseminate their messages
when subject to licensing and injunctive systems because the
higher levels of scrutiny and pressures toward full enforcement
that characterize those systems1 34 increase the probability that
illegal communicative activities will be punished. Since many
speakers who desire to disseminate prohibited communications
will fall into either the second or third of the categories outlined above, there is every reason to believe that the phenomenon of prior adjudication will indeed affect dissemination
patterns regarding communications that are held to be illegal.
Thus, a preference for prior restraint would be a logical way to
implement a desire, based on distrust of audiences, to keep
those communications out of circulation entirely.
There remains the first category of speakers who desire to
disseminate prohibited communications, those who are willing
to accept punishment in order to have their messages reach the
public. When these persons speak, they do so in the spirit of
civil disobedience. The way a regulatory method treats civil
disobedients can say much about its underlying premises regarding the allocation of authority between the state and the
individual citizen. No regulatory system can be expected to legalize civil disobedience. That would amount to a contradiction
in terms. But systems may differ regarding how much of an accommodation they make to the tactic of civil disobedience. A
method of speech regulation that is designed to incapacitate
civil disobedients, to exterminate the tactic of influencing audiences by the measured defiance of certain laws, might be
thought improperly to exalt the authority of the state. It is not
irrational under a theory of limited government to regard certain prohibited communications as valuable due to the checking function they serve, even while exacting a toll from those
persons who disseminate them.135 The rejection of civil disobedience as having no role to play in the political system can be
viewed as one variety of excessive distrust of audiences. It is
134. See text accompanying notes 112-13 supra.
135. I have argued this point in another context. See Blasi, supra note 65, at
648. See aso Kalven, supra note 2, at 34.
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better, however, to treat the total rejection of civil disobedience
as an unacceptable premise in its own right.
The subsequent punishment regimes accommodate civil
disobedience by delaying the intervention of state authority until after the prohibited communication is disseminated. Protestors are permitted to speak now and pay later. Only when
enforcement officials seek to incapacitate speakers, such as by
seizing pamphlets or destroying presses, is the tactic of civil
disobedience denied its rightful role in the checking process.
Such incapacitating regulatory efforts are not unknown, but
they are not the norm.
With regard to their impact on speakers, the prior regulatory regimes seem no worse in terms of accommodating civil
disobedience. An adverse adjudication prior to initial dissemination does not incapacitate, and should not even deter, a civil
disobedient. Speakers who are not averse to being punished
should be no more reluctant to violate permit requirements or
injunctions than criminal prohibitions. When the challenge to
authority is at so fundamental a level, self-help becomes not a
legal procedure dependent on legitimation by courts, but rather
a physical act totally in the control of the speaker. Such factors
as the collateral bar rule and the swiftness and sureness of
punishment would seem not to matter. Owen Fiss has noted,
in fact, that the injunctive form of regulation may actually facilitate civil disobedience because sanctions for contempt tend as
a general matter not to be as severe as criminal sentences or
civil damage awards.1 3 6 Lawbreaker status can be achieved at
a discount price.
These arguments only refute the claim that injunctions and
licensing systems might deter or incapacitate persons from engaging in expression as a form of civil disobedience. There is
another dimension to consider in assessing how the different
regimes accommodate civil disobedience, the dimension of audience reception. It might be argued that civil disobedience
loses much of its effectiveness when it is undertaken in the
face of specific adjudicative judgments of illegality rather than
the generalized prohibitions that criminal laws and civil liability rules represent. In the former context, the speakers may
appear to the public like defiant outlaws, flouting civil authority
in its ultimate guise, instead of legitimate participants in the familiar process of challenge by which laws are tested and enforcement levels settled upon. On the other hand, the greater
136. See 0. Fiss, supra note 13, at 72-73.
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certainty of punishment under injunctive and licensing systems may be a source of audience appeal. Persons who disseminate communications in the face of particularized court
orders are clearly prepared to pay a price in order to convey
their beliefs. In contrast, protestors who openly violate criminal prohibitions may be betting on prosecutorial discretion.
Moreover, if the illegality of the behavior is part of the message
itself, as is the case with civil disobedience, the absence of uncertainty regarding legality should serve to intensify the
communication.
On balance, licensing and injunctive systems do not appear
to differ significantly from the subsequent punishment regimes
in the matter of accommodating civil disobedience. If anything,
it would seem that the prior methods of regulation are slighty
more congenial to civil disobedience. It may even be that the
availability of licensing and injunctive procedures is one factor
that forestalls the widespread resort by officials to truly incapacitating, albeit unauthorized, methods of regulation such as
seize-and-destroy tactics and the preventive detention of
speakers. That civil disobedients arguably fare better as a result of the existence of the prior regulatory systems suggests,
at a minimum, that those systems are not founded on the unacceptable premise that civil disobedience is an illegitimate (not
just illegal) method of seeking to bring about political and social change.
A different troublesome premise that may be implicit in licensing and injunctive systems is that the act of speaking is an
extraordinary endeavor that calls for especially active, comprehensive regulation by the state. For the proper balance of authority between state and citizen to be preserved, it may be
important that the act of speaking, particularly the act of disseminating controversial communications critical of government, be considered a perfectly normal endeavor that calls for
no special regulatory response. For government to treat the act
of speaking as deviant or unusually dangerous is to sow the
seeds of ideological conformity, and thereby to threaten the
political authority of the individual.
Defenders of prior restraint may counter that many activities are enjoinable or subject to a permit requirement. If one
must get a license to drive, build a home, practice a profession,
or keep exotic animals, why not require a license to speak, at
least where the act of speaking poses serious dangers or consumes public resources? If injunctions are available to prevent
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a wide range of irreparable harms, why not use them to prevent
the harmful effects of speech as well? In short, the decision to
subject a particular activity to prior regulation need not be
based, so the argument goes, on the premise that the activity in
question is in any sense abnormal or disfavored.
The examples cited above suggest to me precisely the contrary. Many different kinds of endeavors may be subject to
prior regulation, but they all have in common the quality of being perceived as potentially hazardous activities that require
special standards of care or competence. A high percentage of
the population is permitted to and does drive, but the intrusive
nature of government regulation regarding the operation of motor vehicles serves as a constant reminder that this activity
must be undertaken with particular caution and a high degree
of conformity to social norms. The very fact that a showing of
irreparable harm is a predicate for obtaining injunctive relief
indicates that this form of government intervention is reserved
for activities that are perceived as abnormally threatening to
the social order.
Again, the response might be made that certain communications are indeed abnormally hazardous. Why deny an empirical reality? There may be good reason to do so. If social
conformity is viewed as an omnipresent force that tends to distort public discourse, 3 7 it may be rational in fashioning first
amendment doctrine to undervalue the actual risks posed by
speech if the consequence of candid recognition and full valuation of those risks is to reinforce conformist attitudes. We have
to treat controversial speech as a normal phenomenon, even
though judged solely in terms of the risks it generates such
speech might reasonably be thought to warrant special treatment. Only when the public views controversial speakers as
normal people, with a legitimate role to play in the social system, can the fragile state-individual balance be maintained.
This point has force. Nevertheless, there is something disturbingly paternalistic about building first amendment doctrine
around dubious empirical assertions for the ulterior purpose of
shaping public attitudes toward speakers. Even if that course
is rejected, however, the observation that speech sometimes
can be hazardous does not mean that there is no unacceptable
premise behind the decision to subject speakers to the same
kinds of intrusive regulatory methods that are applied to persons who engage in such potentially hazardous or disruptive
137. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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activities as driving and building. A constitutional order
founded on the consent of the governed perhaps can treat certain extraordinary communications as abnormal because of the
unique dangers they pose, but it cannot coherently regard all or
most (or even many) communications in that way. Such a constitutional order is committed to the accommodation, even facilitation, of social and political change, a process that often
depends on the circulation of controversial communications.
Once again, the notion of rationing comes into play. The occasional, infrequent use of prior restraint does not imply the
premise that the act of speaking in general poses such threats
to the social order that persons who engage in that act need to
be supervised especially closely. The regular, systematic, frequent use of prior restraint implies just such an unacceptable
premise.
Not only do regulatory methods embody premises regarding the role of controversial speech in the workings of the society as a whole, the choice of a regulatory method also reflects a
view regarding the proper role of government in the process by
which communications by private parties are formulated and
disseminated. Respect by officials for the integrity of the communicative process is an essential attribute of limited government. In order for the power of the state to be kept in check, it
is important that the concept of individual autonomy retain
practical significance in the workings of the society. There
have to be some important endeavors, relating to public as well
as private objectives, that individuals are entitled to pursue by
virtue of their status as individuals, and not by sufferance of
the state. Communicating one's views, particularly with respect to public issues, would seem, in light of our constitutional
tradition, to be one of the activities that belongs in this sphere
of individual entitlement. And for that entitlement to reinforce
the crucial, partly symbolic, concept of individual autonomy, a
large measure of control over the details of the activity must remain in the hands of speakers.
One striking feature of licensing and injunctive systems is
the ever present possibility, due to the phenomenon of adjudication prior to initial dissemination, that government officials
may convince speakers to alter the details of their plans in order to conform to the government's preferences. Licensing officials and other regulatory agents can tell speakers exactly what
they need to do to avoid the costs, delays, and stresses of litigation. In the setting of mass demonstrations, it may seem a triumph of social cooperation for speakers to alter their plans
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marginally in order to accommodate the regulatory priorities of
the state. If one thinks of film or book editing, however, the
prospect of government prescribed alterations is a cause for
concern. Whether the government dictates changes to speakers who have no real bargaining power, or negotiates for alterations in a spirit of give and take, the symbolic division of
authority between the state and the individual is upset when
the government so intrudes itself into the formulative stages of
the communicative process.
Such prescriptive participation by government in the planning of speech activities can also occur under a regime of criminal sanctions whenever speakers establish informal contact
with officials prior to the time of dissemination. Promises not
to prosecute can be conditioned on alterations of content or
form. Contact between speakers and officials prior to dissemination is far more common under licensing and injunctive systems, however, because their procedures necessarily bring
speakers and regulatory agents together before the communicative event occurs. In the case of civil lawsuits, moreover, the
government is hardly ever involved as an adversary party, so
the phenomenon of official prescription of the details of communications is virtually nonexistent. Thus, the premise that
government may properly participate on a regular basis in the
formulation by private speakers of the details of their communications is implicit only in regimes that exhibit the feature of
adjudication prior to initial dissemination.
It may be objected that so long as prospective speakers
have no duty to bargain, so long as they can refuse to compromise the integrity of their communications and instead contest
the government in court, the role of the state is not exalted nor
that of the individual demeaned. Speakers tempted to bite at
the apple of compromise are in no position to complain on libertarian grounds about the government's failure to protect
them from their own lack of willpower. There are higher values
in our constitutional system, however, than the avoidance of
paternalism. Although a succession of individual speakers may
freely accept the intrusion of government into the formulative
stages of the communicative process, the collective effect of
such a pattern of intervention can amount to a fundamental reallocation of roles in the direction of greater authority for the
state and less authority for the individual. A regulatory system
that promotes such a reallocation of roles can be thought to be
based on unacceptable premises regarding the proper relationship between the state and the individual. That is true even
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when the immediate actors in the regulatory drama remain insensitive to the dimension of role allocation, or cravenly choose
to ignore it.
The government's ability under the prior regulatory regimes to affect the timing of speech also expands the role of the
state in determining the details of communications by private
parties. We have discussed how officially prescribed delay
bears on self-censorship by speakers and the reception of communications by audiences. 38 Here the concern is not with behavioral effects but with what is implied about the division of
authority between the state and the individual when private
speakers are denied the right to communicate spontaneously,
when they must speak only on the government's schedule. The
delays inherent in the modern prior regulatory regimes are
usually short and subject to constitutional limitation, but even
short delays take from speakers the power to determine precisely when to disseminate their communications. When government possesses the power to delay communications that it
cannot suppress, speakers cannot be said truly to control, in
the sense required for autonomy, their own communicative endeavors. In this regard, the officially prescribed delays inherent
in licensing and injunctive systems seem inconsistent with the
premise of individual autonomy. The subsequent punishment
regimes do not, in their normal operation, impose such delays.
The premise of individual autonomy may also be denied
when speakers are treated by the regulatory process in an undignified manner. Respect as well as control is a central component of the notion of autonomy. In one regard, the prior
regulatory regimes can be said to pay controversial speakers
the highest respect-by taking them seriously. Licensing systems and injunctions are based on the premise that controversial speech sometimes needs to be prevented precisely because
it matters, that unorthodox and dissident speakers are not, as
Holmes implied, so ineffectual and pathetic that they can safely
be ignored.13 9 In other ways, however, the prior regulatory regimes might be thought to treat speakers with less than the full
measure of respect required by the notion of individual
autonomy.
It might be argued that licensing systems force speakers to
assume the role of supplicants asking the government for per138. See section IV(B) supra at 30-33; section VII supra at 63-69.
139. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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mission to carry on their communicative endeavors. Even
when that permission is promptly and cheerfully granted, the
speakers may feel demeaned by the procedure. Milton's disdain for licensing stemmed in large part from this source of
irritation.140
Under modern licensing systems, however, prospective
speakers do not really ask permission. They assert claims of
right. The procedures required by Freedmanv. Maryland institutionalize the premise that obtaining a license is not a matter
of grace but rather of entitlement.' 4 ' There is nothing undignified about appearing before an adjudicative official or tribunal
for the purpose of demanding one's due.
In order for the supplication argument to figure in the present analysis, moreover, it must be shown that injunctions also
require speakers to assume the posture of supplicants. It is
true that under the collateral bar rule enjoined speakers must
go to court to vacate injunctions before they may proceed to
speak. That requirement may be objectionable due to the delays and burden of initiative it imposes, 42 but can the act of appealing a judicial order really be characterized as an exercise
in supplication? I think not, and therefore conclude that there
is no denial of individual autonomy implicit in the fact that
under licensing and injunctive systems speakers are routinely
obligated to appear in court before embarking on their communicative ventures.
The disallowance of self-help, a feature shared by licensing
systems and injunctions governed by the collateral bar rule,
may be thought to deny the premise of individual autonomy in
another way. Speakers at times will suffer punishment for engaging in acts of expression that are protected under substantive first amendment standards. Prosecution in situations
covered by a collateral bar rule is for failure to follow prescribed procedures, not for any harm engendered by the expressive activity itself. There is a certain regimental quality
about a doctrine that so exalts the government's procedures.
One must also sympathize with the plight of the prosecuted
speaker who has a good first amendment claim on the merits
but can tell it only to the wind.
Of course, procedure-in the form of categorical, obligatory,
sometimes harsh prescriptions of when and how-is the mortar
140. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
142. See sections IV(A) &IV(B) supra at 28-33.
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of the rule of law. Surely a first amendment concern for individual autonomy would not be grounds for suspending filing
deadlines or waiver rules. There is a fine but essential line,
however, between the ordering of adjudicative discourse and
the imposition of behavioral standards on persons enmeshed in
the legal process. When that line is crossed, individuals become the instruments rather than beneficiaries of the adjudicative machinery. Autonomy is then denied.
The collateral bar rule for injunctions serves an ordering
function in some contexts. If special policing is needed for a
mass demonstration, for instance, there is much to be said for
requiring protestors to vindicate their constitutional rights in
court, if at all possible, rather than in the streets. In most circumstances, however, no major ordering function is served by
the disallowance of self-help. The collateral bar rule probably
owes its existence to a desire to reinforce the mystique of injunctions, reflecting a philosophy of social control and a disregard for individual freedom that seems out of place as applied
to expressive activity. In this regard, injunctive systems governed by the collateral bar rule fail to respect the autonomy of
speakers.
Under a licensing system, speakers who proceed without a
required permit can be punished for that act alone. They might
have had a permit for the asking, but if they didn't ask they can
be punished. No first amendment defense will be heard. Only
if the speakers seek the permit, and also make some effort to
achieve a judicial overruling of an administrative denial, may
they engage in self-help.14 3 However, the rule against self-help
in the context of licensing systems seems hardly gratuitous, or
even controversial. If speakers were free to ignore the permit
requirement whenever they would be constitutionally entitled
to obtain the permit, there would be little point in having a licensing system at all. Thus, insofar as a denial of autonomy depends on the overbearing character of the government's
procedural prescriptions, the disallowance of self-help in the
permit process does not seem objectionable. The insistence
upon prescribed procedures which characterize the collateral
bar rules that govern both licensing systems and injunctions
does not, therefore, link the two regimes of prior regulation in
the matter of premises.
I conclude that whenever they are employed in a routine
and comprehensive fashion, licensing and injunctive systems
143. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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share three implicit premises that are unacceptable in a constitutional order that is founded on the principle of limited government and hence committed to maintaining a balance of
authority between the state and the individual. First, the widespread use of licensing or enjoining implies a premise of comparative distrust, a belief that it is more dangerous to trust
audiences with controversial communications than it is to trust
the legal process with the power to suppress speech. Second,
the invocation of such extraordinary regulatory procedures as
permit requirements and injunctions implies that the activity
of disseminating controversial communications is abnormally
hazardous or disruptive, and hence represents a threat to,
rather than an integral feature of, the social order. Third, licensing systems and injunctions coerce or induce speakers to
relinquish full control over the details and timing of their communications. These regulatory systems must be premised,
therefore, on the notion that either such control is not an essential attribute of the autonomy of speakers, or that such autonomy need not be respected. Either premise is objectionable.
The common feature of unacceptable premises constitutes a
basis for a theory of prior restraint that is independent of the
behavioral analysis undertaken in the preceding sections.
IX. THE RATIONALE FOR LINKAGE AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COLLATERAL BAR RULE
The preceding analysis has been confined to a comparison
of regulatory methods assuming that the collateral bar rule govems injunctions. At present, the collateral rule is applied with
sufficient regularity that it may properly be viewed as a defining characteristic of the injunctive procedure. Some commentators have suggested, however, that the collateral bar rule
ought to be abandoned or severely restricted, at least for injunctions that regulate communication. 4 4 If that course is followed, certain of these commentators assert, the case for a
presumption against regulating speech by injunction would no
longer be compelling.145 If that contention is true, the central
linkage between licensing systems and injunctions that lies at
the heart of modem prior restraint doctrine would be broken.
We would be left perhaps with a presumption against licensing,
but no theory supporting a broader doctrine of prior restraint.
144. See 0. Fss, supra note 13, 68-74; Barnett, supra note 14, at 557; authorities cited in note 42, supra.
145. .See 0. Fiss, supra note 13, 68-74; Barnett, supra note 14, at 558..
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It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether the arguments
developed in this paper hold up when injunctions are assumed
not to be governed by the collateral bar rule.
The self-censorship analysis developed above changes significantly if the collateral bar rule does not govern injunctions,
but no different conclusion emerges from the altered analysis.
It will be recalled that the burden of initiative and delay constituted the only two important sources of self-censorship under
the prior regulatory regimes, and that those sources were judged not to cause as much self-censorship as the factors of uncertainty and the possibility of heavy sanctions that operate under
the subsequent punishment regimes. 46 If enjoined speakers
do not have to contend with the collateral bar rule, and thus
can assert their constitutional rights by engaging in self-help,
the burden of initiative and delay should cause no self-censorship whatever. Speakers need take no initiative regarding the
legal process, and need not wait for anyone's permission.
On the other hand, the factors of personalization and expeditious-enforcement, which were judged not to cause significant
self-censorship when the collateral bar rule governs,147 could
be a source of self-censorship when self-help is permitted. Personalization gives speakers relatively precise information regarding what activities are prohibited, increases the likelihood
of prosecution for violations, and contributes to the mystique of
injunctions. Persons who know that their proposed activities
are covered by the legal prohibition, and will lead to prosecution if undertaken, may be deterred on those accounts from
pursuing their self-help remedy. Behind the decision to engage
in self-help may often lie the hope that vindication in court will
not be necessary. That hope can only be diminished by the
phenomenon of personalization. This point has some force, but
it is also likely that on occasion the personalized, adversary
character of the proceedings at which injunctions are issued
will heighten the first amendment consciousness and competitive spirit of speakers, emboldening them to pursue all available means of vindication, including self-help.
The mystique that surrounds injunctions traces in part to
their personalized character, 46 and could be a factor that
would deter some speakers from pursuing a self-help remedy.
That mystique, however, may actually be a function of the col146. See sections IV(A) & IV(B) supra at 28-33; IV(F) supra at 47-48.
147. See sections IV(D) & IV(E) supra at 35-47.
148. See section IV(D) supra at 35-43.
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lateral bar rule. Were self-help to be legitimated as a remedy
for improper injunctions, no overtones of defiance would accompany the decision by a speaker to violate an injunction. If
the phenomenon of mystique traces to basic notions of respect
for law, it would seem that no mystique should inhibit persons
from respectfully asserting their rights by means of the authorized remedy of self-help. In sum, the abandonment of the collateral bar rule for injunctions might increase to some extent
the impact of personalization on self-censorship. There is no
reason to suppose, however, that the increase would be
dramatic.
The factor of expeditious enforcement would be a more important cause of self-censorship were the collateral bar rule not
in operation. It seems logical that persons contemplating the
violation of law are influenced in their behavioral calculations
not only by the certainty and severity of sanctions, but also by
the swiftness with which they are administered. So long as
self-help is an unauthorized remedy, it should be of no concern
in the self-censorship analysis whether speakers decide not to
violate injunctions for fear of swift conviction and sanctions.
When acts of expression in violation of injunctions become constitutionally protected, however, the deterrent effect of expeditious enforcement is a matter of first amendment concern. In
this regard, the legitimation of self-help represented by the
abandonment of the collateral bar rule would alter the analysis
by redefining what counts as self-censorship.
On balance, injunctions not governed by the collateral bar
rule could be expected to engender certain kinds of self-censorship on account of their distinctive features, but probably not
significantly more self-censorship than was ascribed to injunctions and licensing systems in the preceding analysis. The increase in self-censorship due to personalization and
expeditious enforcement under a regime in which self-help was
authorized would seem to be offset by the elimination of selfcensorship traceable to the burden of initiative and delay. Reversing the assumption regarding the collateral bar rule thus
would not affect the conclusion that the self-censorship rationale for disfavoring prior restraints is unconvincing.
Under the analysis undertaken in this paper, a major element in the case for a presumption against prior restraint is the
undesirably abstract quality of any adjudication that occurs
prior to the time the communication at issue is initially disseminated to the public. If the collateral bar rule were no longer to
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govern injunctions, adjudication of the first amendment claims
of enjoined speakers would be of a less abstract character, but
still somewhat problematic in this regard.
When self-help is a legitimate procedure for asserting
rights, the issue in a prosecution for violating an injunction is
whether the restraint on speaking was unconstitutional at the
time it was imposed. That reasonable apprehensions which induced and justified the restraint in the first place failed to materialize does not impeach the state's case for regulation. If
validity at the time of issuance is the question to be determined, adjudication of the constitutionality of injunctions remains somewhat abstract in character, even when the
abandonment of the collateral bar rule permits constitutional
claims to be raised in contempt proceedings. In theory, such
factors as actual harm caused (or lack thereof), audience reception,fait accompli dynamics, and the lack of prospective accountability should not influence the constitutional judgments
that are reached.
It is likely, however, that these moderating factors, which
were determined in the preceding analysis to be salutary from
the standpoint of first amendment theory,149 will have some effect even when constitutional adjudication takes place at the
contempt stage. For then the initial dissemination will have occurred. The judges will know what happened. The wisdom of
hindsight is bound to play a role in their constitutional deliberations. If hindsight has an influence in this regard, injunctive
systems not governed by the collateral bar rule may not differ
significantly from the subsequent punishment regimes so far as
the quality of constitutional adjudication is concerned. In fact,
for most criminal prohibitions and civil liability rules, the actual consequences in particular cases are theoretically irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the prohibition on
speaking. Hindsight enters the adjudicative process only by
the back door. Holmes's test for criminal cases, it should be
remembered, was clear and present danger, not harmful
results.
There are, however, at least two reasons to believe that
courts will be more influenced by hindsight, to the benefit of
speakers, in the context of subsequent punishment adjudication than in contempt proceedings and the appeals that flow
therefrom. First, in the case of injunctions there exists an antecedent constitutional judgment, uninfluenced by hindsight,
149.

See section V supra.
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geared to the details of the actual communication at issue, rendered at the issuance stage after full adversary argument. That
judgment is bound to operate as a check on the subsequent use
of hindsight, particularly at the contempt proceeding itself
where the same judge who made the original constitutional determination is likely to be the decision maker. Even at the appellate stage, the original, pre-dissemination judgment
regarding constitutionality is likely to exert a force. In the case
of criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits, in contrast, no constitutional judgment regarding the particular communication in
dispute occurs until after the moment of initial dissemination.
The first adjudicator to consider the case, as well as all those
who come later, is subject to the salutary temptations of
hindsight.
Second, even if the collateral bar rule is abandoned, courts
have a powerful incentive to avoid letting events subsequent to
dissemination of the communication in question influence their
constitutional judgments at the contempt stage. If hindsight
comes to play a major role in determining which injunctions
are ruled invalid, rational speakers will always prefer to assert
their rights by self-help, never by moving to vacate or modify
the injunction prior to the time of dissemination. The judicial
system cannot afford, on grounds both of equity and efficiency,
to penalize speakers who pursue the more orderly anticipatory
procedures for pressing their constitutional claims.
For these two reasons, courts are likely to be less influenced by events subsequent to dissemination when ruling
upon self-help challenges to injunctions than in adjudicating
criminal prosecutions and civil damage actions. If that is true,
the considerations discussed in the preceding analysis that indicate that adjudication prior to initial dissemination tends to
lead to more restrictive interpretations of the first amendment
would operate to some extent even if the collateral bar rule
were abandoned. Injunctions would still have in common with
licensing systems a tendency to generate undesirably abstract
constitutional judgments. A theory of prior restraint based on
that tendency would retain validity.
Another major component of the case for linking injunctions with licensing systems is the tendency of both methods of
regulation to be used more readily than methods that rely on
subsequent punishment. Virtually every argument relating to
overuse developed in the preceding analysis would remain applicable were the collateral bar rule no longer to govern injunc-
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tions. A stroke of the pen by a single judge would still be
sufficient to create the legal prohibition. The expeditious nature of the proceedings at which injunctions are issued would
still encourage regulatory agents by holding out the prospect of
almost instant gratification of the urge to prohibit speech. At
the enforcement stage, moreover, the absence of the collateral
bar rule would not affect most of the forces that encourage the
prosecution of all violations. Disobedience of such a personalized prohibition would still be highly visible, and would often
be viewed as a test of the judicial system's will. The prospect
of expeditious conviction of offenders would continue to spur
prosecutorial authorities into action.
The only real difference that abandonment of the collateral
bar rule would make is that prosecutors would have to consider
the possibility of a successful constitutional defense by speakers who violate injunctions. But since the regulatory forces will
have already won the first constitutional skirmish (at the issuance stage), that possibility is not likely to have much effect on
the decision whether to prosecute. For all intents and purposes, the overuse rationale against prior restraint remains
fully intact when the assumption is shifted regarding whether
injunctions are governed by the collateral bar rule. The
overuse rationale, moreover, constitutes one of the most important components of the case for linking licensing systems and
injunctions in a theory of prior restraint.
Somewhat less important in the overall scheme of the analysis is the factor of audience reception. It will be recalled that
licensing systems and injunctions were found to distort the
way audiences receive controversial communications in two
ways: by delaying the moment of initial dissemination, and by
officially characterizing communications at the time audiences
receive them.
If the collateral bar rule were abandoned, distortion due to
delay should not be a consideration. Speakers would regain
complete control over the timing of their communications, and
could choose the moments when audience reception was likely
to be most favorable. The problem of the distorting filter-the
labeling of communications before audiences can respond to
them afresh-would remain, however. The costs, in terms of
first amendment values, of this distorting fiter are not sufficient in themselves to justify a presumption against licensing
systems and injunctions; the delay factor represents the more
serious cause of distortion of audience reception. Nonetheless,
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at least something of the audience reception rationale survives
the change of assumptions regarding the collateral bar rule.
Moreover, since the dimension of audience reception is not a
central consideration in the case for linking injunctions with licensing systems, the abandonment of the collateral bar rule
would not seriously affect the theory of prior restraint developed in the body of this paper.
Finally, there is the matter of unacceptable premises. An
important reason for disfavoring injunctions and licensing systems as methods of speech regulation is that they rest on three
objectionable premises: (1) that speakers and audiences are to
be trusted less than regulatory processes; (2) that the act of
speaking is an abnormally hazardous activity that warrants
special regulation; and (3) that the integrity of the communication or the autonomy of the speaker is not undermined when
government plays a large role in determining the details and
timing of a communication. Part of the argument against licensing systems and injunctions based on their unacceptable
premises no longer would apply if the collateral bar rule were
abandoned, but enough of the argument would remain intact to
constitute at least a significant component of, if not an independently sufficient basis for, a theory of prior restraint.
No premise of comparative distrust is implicit in an injunctive system that is not governed by the collateral bar rule.
Such a system is designed more to sanction speech than to
suppress it. Audiences are trusted to receive communications
that speakers believe will be ruled to be constitutionally protected. In cases of unusually strong favorable public response,
the prosecutorial and adjudicative processes can even be influenced in the direction of condoning the speech, even though
this development is not likely to occur with regularity. The legitimation of self-help makes all the difference in the world so
far as the premise of distrust is concerned.
On the other hand, the abandonment of the collateral bar
rule would seem not to alter the premise implicit in both licensing systems and injunctions that the dissemination of controversial communications is an abnormally hazardous and
disruptive activity. Even when self-help is permitted as a remedy for challenging injunctions, the choice of the injunctive
method of regulation represents a judgment that the activity in
question requires special, personalized, swift control. The mobilization of judicial authority at the anticipatory stage has
symbolic overtones. Since "irreparable harm" is the standard
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for injunctions, moreover, frequent resort by officials to the injunctive method of regulation would necessarily be based on
the premise that as a general matter controversial speech
threatens rather than strengthens the social fabric.
With regard to the third of the unacceptable premises
listed above, the abandonment of the collateral bar rule would
significantly alter the analysis. If self-help were permitted, regulatory officials would have no control over the timing of communications and little leverage to force speakers to negotiate
over other details. There might remain some incentives for
speakers to alter their plans in order to win official favor, but
one could not say that official participation in the planning of
communications would be so prominent a feature of the system
as to imply basic underlying premises that negate the autonomy of speakers.
Thus, only one of the unacceptable premises would remain
were injunctions no longer to be governed by the collateral bar
rule. But that premise-that speech is a particularly dangerous
endeavor that warrants special regulatory treatment-is one
that cannot be accepted in a constitutional regime built upon
the distrust of government and the willing acceptance of social
change.
In conclusion, licensing systems have in common with injunctive systems that permit self-help several distinctive features that might figure in a theory of prior restraint. The most
important of these features are the adjudication of constitutional claims with little attention to the contributions of
hindsight, a strong tendency to be used casually and comprehensively, and acceptance of the premise that speech is an abnormally dangerous social force. The argument for linking
licensing systems with injunctions at the center of a theory of
prior restraint does not depend on the continued applicability
of the collateral bar rule. The case for linkage is persuasive in
any event.
X.

CONCLUSION

Under the assumption that the collateral bar rule governs
injunctions, the case is convincing for linking together licensing
systems and injunctions, and subjecting those methods of regulation to an adverse presumption designed to restrict their use
to exceptional situations. Although there is no reason to believe that licensing and injunctive systems cause more self-censorship of constitutionally protected communications than
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subsequent punishment regimes, the two principal methods of
prior regulation should be disfavored because they both must
rely upon adjudication in the abstract, they both encourage regulatory agents to overuse the power to regulate, and they both
adversely affect audience reception of controversial messages.
In addition, licensing and injunctive systems both embody, if
only implicitly, certain unacceptable premises regarding the respective spheres of authority of the state and the individual citizen. Even if one does not assume that the collateral bar rule
governs injunctions, several of these decisive objections remain
valid. Once the focus is shifted away from self-censorship, convincing reasons can be found for analogizing the enjoining of a
communication to the historically disfavored practice of licensing speech. The concept of prior restraint is coherent at the
core.

